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Analyzing standard safety properties of a given program has tradition-
ally been the primary focus of the program analysis community. Unfortunately,
there are still many interesting analysis tasks that cannot be effectively ex-
pressed with standard safety properties. One such example is to derive the
asymptotic complexity of a given program. Another example is to verify re-
lational properties, i.e. properties that must be satisfied jointly by multiple
programs of multiple runs of one program. Existing program analysis tech-
niques for standard safety properties are usually not immediately applicable to
asymptotic complexity analysis problems and relational verification problems.
New approaches are therefore needed to solve these unconventional problems.
This thesis studies techniques for algorithmic complexity analysis as
well as relational verification. To that end, we present three case studies:
(1) We propose a new fuzzing technique for automatically finding inputs that
viii
trigger a program’s worst-case resource usage. (2) We show how to build a scal-
able, end-to-end side channel detection tool by combining static taint analysis
and a program logic designed for verifying non-interference of a given program.
(3) We propose a general and effective relational verification algorithm that
combines reinforcement learning with backtracking search. A common theme
among all these solutions is to exploit problem-specific structures and adapt
existing techniques to exploit those structures accordingly.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Traditionally, the primary focus of the program analysis community
has been the analysis of standard safety properties of a girven program. Intu-
itively, a safety property states that a “bad” event never happends in any run
of the program. Such properties can therefore be refuted by observing a sin-
gle trace of the program [176]. Many important program analysis tasks, such
as null pointer dereference detection [54], use-after-free detection [180, 105],
integer overflow detection [53], downcast safety checking [172] and taint track-
ing [81, 9], can be natually modeled as standard safety properties. Over the
years, various automated techniques—both static and dynamic—have been
developed to facilitate these analysis tasks. Examples of such techniques are
fuzz testing [173], binary rewriting [137], abstract interpretation [46], symbolic
execution [94], and deductive verification [100].
Despite the emphasis on standard safety checking in the program anal-
ysis literature, there are many interesting analysis tasks that go beyond stan-
dard safety properties. One such example is to derive the asymptotic complex-
ity of a given program. Reasoning about a program’s asymptotic complexity,
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especially in the worst case, is an important problem that has many practical
applications, including performance bug detection and identification of secu-
rity vulnerabilities. For instance, automated complexity analysis can identify
cases where an algorithm’s expected worst-case complexity does not match
that of its implementation, thus indicating the presence of a performance bug.
Such techniques are also useful for detecting availability vulnerabilities that
allow attackers to cause denial-of-service (e.g., through algorithmic complex-
ity attacks [47, 185, 34, 95]). Since the asymptotic behavior of a program is
defined by its resource usage on a series of inputs with growing sizes [45], a
single program trace is typically not sufficient to precisely characterize it. As
a result, the problem falls outside the scope of standard safety analysis.
Another example that cannot be effectively modeled as standard safety
is the verification of relational properties, i.e., properties that must be satisfied
jointly by multiple programs or multiple runs of one program. A prototyp-
ical relational property is program equivalence which requires that two pro-
grams have the same observable behavior when executed on the same input.
Another example is non-interference [73], which states that two terminat-
ing executions of a program must produce the same output given the same
non-confidential input, regardless of the confidential data accessed by the pro-
gram. Non-interference is important in privacy-oriented software since its vi-
olation makes the system vulnerable to side-channel attacks, which have been
used to infer confidential data involving user accounts [82, 60], cryptographic
keys [96, 32, 5], geographic locations [161], and medical data [38]. In addition,
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relational properties also arise in the context of software evolution [101, 102]
and version control [171].
Unconventional tasks like asymptotic complexity analysis and relational
verification have been less well-studied than traditional standard safety analy-
sis , yet they become increasingly relevant today as security and confidentiality
get increasingly valued in the process of modern software development. The
main topic of this thesis is to develop new techniques for reasoning about al-
gorithmic complexity and relational properties, which are problems that fall
outside of the standard safety analysis.
1.2 Contributions
We now give an overview for the specific analysis tasks we examined
and highlight the contributions of this thesis.
1.2.1 Understanding worst case complexity
The first problem we address is the analysis of a program’s worst case
computational complexity. For example, given a program that performs tradi-
tional quicksort on an integer array, our technique will identify the worst-case
complexity for this program is Θ(n2) and provide a series of concrete inputs
(with increasing size) that demonstrate the Θ(n2) behavior.
To solve this problem, we propose a new fuzzing technique for auto-
matically finding inputs that trigger a program’s worst-case resource usage.
We demonstrate how the problem of algorithmic complexity analysis can be
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reduced to the problem of optimal program synthesis, and we show how the
synthesis problem can be solved with evolutionary search.
1.2.2 Detecting side-channel vulnerability
The second problem we address is the static detection of side-channel
vulnerabilities. Our technique takes the source code (or the bytecode) of an
application together with a set of annotations describing the data that should
be considered confidential. Then it check whether the resource usage pattern
of the application is correlated with the values of the confidential data.
We show how we can build a scalable, end-to-end side channel detection
tool by combining static taint analysis and Quantitative Cartesian Hoare Logic
(QCHL), a program logic designed for verifying non-interference of a given
program. Static taint analysis allows us to quickly scan the entire program
and nail down code regions that may potentially be vulnerable. QCHL allows
us to analyze the identified code region precisely, reducing the number of false
alarms.
1.2.3 Proving general relational properties
The third problem we address is the proof of general relational prop-
erties, such as functional equivalence, symmetry, and transitivity. These rela-
tional properties serve as the basis of many practical applications, including
certified compiler transformation [134], regression check [101, 102], automatic
merge conflict resolution [171], and static verification of relational code con-
4
tract [170].
We show how to formulate the relational verification problem as a
Markov Decision Process, whose optimal policy can be solved by the technique
of policy gradient from reinforcement learning. We then propose an general
and effective relational verification algorithm that combines the learned policy
with a backtracking search.
1.3 Thesis Outline
To evaluate our analysis techniques, we build three different systems in
our study:
• Singularity, a worst-case algorithmic complexity analyzer based on
dynamic fuzzing. This will be the topic of chapter 2.
• Themis, a static analyzer that tries to verify the absence of resource-
usage side channel vulnerability. Chapter 3 covers the verifier in more
detail.
• Coeus, an extension of Themis’ verification algorithm to generalize to
a wider variety of properties and programs. We discuss the enhancement
and its implications in chapter 4 .
We discuss related works in Chapter 5. Conclusion and future work
will be presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Detection of Algorithmic
Complexity Vulnerabilities
In this chapter, we propose a dynamic program analysis technique that
automatically find the worst-case algorithmic complexity of a given program.
While there is a large body of literature on worst-case complexity analy-
sis [79, 35, 166, 85], most of these techniques do not produce worst performance
inputs, henceforth called WPIs, that trigger the worst-case performance be-
havior of the target program. Such WPIs are very useful for many real-world
applications mentioned in Chapter 1.1. For example, they can be used to
debug performance problems or to confirm the presence of security vulnerabil-
ities. Furthermore, WPIs can shed light on the cause of worst-case executions,
and they also help programmers write suitable sanitizers to guard their code
against potential DoS attacks. Hence, our goal here is not only to determine
the worst-case complexity, but to also produce concrete input that triggers the
worst case.
0Portions of this chapter have been published in FSE 2018 [184]. Jia contributed to all
aspects of the implementation and evaluation in this chapter.
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2.1 Overview
The key insight underlying our approach is that WPIs almost always
follow a specific pattern that can be expressed as a simple program. For in-
stance, to trigger the worst-case performance of an insertion sort algorithm,
the input array must be in reverse sorted order, which can be programmatically
generated by appending larger and larger numbers to an empty list.
Based on this observation, we transform the algorithmic complexity
vulnerbility detection problem to a program synthesis problem, where the goal
is to find a program that expresses the common pattern shared by all WPIs.
In particular, given a target program P whose resource usage we want to max-
imize, our algorithm synthesizes another program G, called a generator, such
that the outputs of G correspond precisely to the WPIs of P. Since the com-
mon pattern underlying WPIs can often be represented using small generator
programs, this approach allows us to discover WPIs very efficiently.
The problem of finding patterns that characterize WPIs corresponds to
an optimal synthesis problem, where the goal is to synthesize a generator G such
that the values produced by G maximize the target program’s resource usage.
Our method solves this optimal synthesis problem by performing feedback-
guided optimization using genetic programming. Specifically, we represent
generators using a new programming model called Recurrent Computation
Graphs (RCG) that are (a) expressive enough to model most input patterns of
interest and yet (b) restrictive enough to make the search space manageable.
Given this representation, our method looks for an optimal RCG by applying
7
def quick_sort(xs):
if(xs.length <= 1):
return xs
pivot = xs[xs.length/2]
left, middle, right = []
for x in xs:
if(x==pivot):
middle.append(x)
elif(x<pivot):
left.append(x)
else:
right.append(x)
left = quick_sort(left)
right = quick_sort(right)
return concat(left, middle, right)
Figure 2.1: QuickSort with middle pivot selection
genetic operators (e.g., mutation, crossover) to existing RCGs and biasing the
search towards generators that maximize the target program’s resource usage.
2.2 Motivating Example
We now informally describe our complexity testing technique on the
simple quickSort example shown in Figure 2.1 as Python code. For concrete-
ness, let us assume that generators are expressed in the simple DSL shown in
Figure 2.2. Specifically, a program G in this language is a tuple (c, e) where
c is a constant seed value and e is an expression that operates over lists and
integers. In particular, the semantics of program G is an infinite sequence of
values where the i’th value in the sequence is given by ei(c), denoting i suc-
cessive applications of expression e to value c. As we will see in Section 2.3,
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P := (C, λx.LE)
E := IE | LE
C := Int | List
IE := Int | x | plus(IE, IE) | minus(IE, IE)
| times(IE, IE) | length(LE)
LE := List | x | append(LE,E) | prepend(E,LE)
| concat(LE,LE)
Figure 2.2: A simple DSL for expressing generators in motivating example
this DSL is a simple instantiation of the recurrent computation graph model
that we use to express generators.
The input pattern that triggers the worst-case complexity of this quickSort
implementation can be described using the following generator in the DSL of
Figure 2.2:
G∗ =
(
[0], λx.append(prepend(length(x) + 1, x), length(x))
)
which produces the following sequence of inputs:
[0], [2, 0, 1], [4, 2, 0, 1, 3], [6, 4, 2, 0, 1, 5], . . .
Observe that these inputs indeed trigger the worst-case behavior of the quickSort
implementation from Figure 2.1 because (a) the smallest value in each list of
the sequence is the middle element, and (b) the quicksort implementation
Figure 2.1 chooses the middle element as its pivot.
We now explain how Singularity triggers this O(n2) behavior of this
quicksort implementation by solving an optimal program synthesis problem.
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Specifically, our goal is to find a generator G in the DSL of Figure 2.2 that
maximizes the running time of quicksort for sufficiently large inputs. As men-
tioned earlier, Singularity solves this optimization problem using genetic
programming (GP).
Specifically, Singularity starts with a population of randomly-generated
programs that conform to the context-free grammar given in Figure 2.2 and
evaluates the fitness of each program. Since our goal is to maximize running
time, the fitness function assigns a higher score to programs that take longer.
For simplicity, let us assume that we evaluate running time on some particular
input size, such as arrays of length 100.
Even though it is highly unlikely that the target generator G∗ occurs
in the initial population P , it might be the case that P contains several use-
ful, albeit suboptimal, functions such as f1 = λx.append(x, length(x)) and
f2 = λx.prepend(length(x), x). These functions are useful in the sense that
the desired pattern can be obtained by mixing these functions using genetic
operators.
For the next iteration, the genetic programming algorithm randomly
picks “fit” generators from the previous iteration. For example, the input
patterns ([0], f1) and ([0], f2) are likely to be selected because they have higher
than average resource usage. Singularity then uses these input patterns to
generate a new population by combining them using genetic operators, such
as mutation and crossover. For example, we can obtain the following program
10
f3 from f1 and f2 by using the crossover operation:
λx.append(prepend(length(x), x), length(x))
In particular, crossover replaces a random sub-expression from one program
with another sub-expression from another program. In this case, we can obtain
f3 from f1, f2 by replacing the sub-expression x in f1 with f2. Furthermore,
f3 results in higher resource consumption compared to f1 and f2.
We continue the process of generating new populations and monitor
both their maximal and average performance. In general, average performance
will keep increasing over generations and, at some point, Singularity will
generate the desired program G∗ from ([0], f3) by mutating the sub-expression
length(x) to length(x) + 1. Since ([0], f ∗) can be used to generate an input
of size 100 that achieves the maximal possible resource usage, our algorithm
will terminate with the desired input pattern G∗. Observe that we can now
determine the worst-case complexity of this quicksort implementation by mea-
suring the running time of quickSort on the input values generated by G∗ and
using standard techniques to fit a curve through these data points.
2.3 Formal Description
In this section, we formally present the problem as well as out solution.
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2.3.1 Problem Definition
Given a target program P, our goal is to find an input pattern that
triggers P’s worst-case resource usage. As mentioned in Section 2.1, we repre-
sent input patterns as generator programs G that produce an infinite sequence
of increasingly large inputs for P.
Definition 1. (Generator) Given a program P with signature τ → τ ′, a
generator G for P is a program with signature unit → Stream(τ). We write
Gi to indicate the i’th element in the stream produced by G and require that
size(Gi) > size(Gj) whenever i > j.
Because our goal is to maximize the resource usage of a given program,
we need a metric for measuring the size of an input and its corresponding
resource usage. Thus, a problem configuration in our setting consists of a
triple (P,Σ,Ψ), where P is the target program with signature τ → τ ′, Σ is a
metric for measuring the size of any value of type τ , and Ψ is a function of
type τ → R that measures the resource usage of P on any input of type τ .
In particular, we write Ψ(s) to denote the resource usage of P on a concrete
input s of type τ . We also use the notation G≤n to denote the largest element
Gi such Σ(Gi) ≤ n.
To compare the resource usage of two patterns, we define the following
binary relation  on a pair of generators:
Definition 2. (Relation ) A generator G is asymptotically better than an-
other generator G′, written G  G′, iff the resource usage of G on the target
12
program exceeds that of G′ for all sufficiently large sizes :
∃nˆ.∀n > nˆ. Ψ(G≤n) > Ψ(G′≤n)
Given a problem configuration (P,Σ,Ψ), we now formalize our goal as
follows:
Definition 3. The goal of the algorithmic complexity vulnerability testing
problem is to find an input pattern whose asymptotic resource usage on P
is not worse than any other pattern. That is, we want to find a G such that:
∀G′. G′ 6 G
Our problem definition implicitly assumes the existence of a program-
ming language over which generators are defined. While we can, in principle,
use any language for defining generators, we will restrict our attention to
generators that can be expressed as recurrent computation graphs (RCG). In-
tuitively, we choose RCGs as the underlying representation because they are
expressive enough to capture any input pattern of interest, but also restrictive
enough to keep the search space manageable.
2.3.2 Recurrence Computation Graphs
Definition 4. (Recurrent Computation Graph) A recurrent computation
graph G is a triple (I,F,O) where I is a tuple of initialization expressions, F
is a tuple of update expressions (where |I| = |F|), and O is a tuple of output
expressions.
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Figure 2.3: Recurrent computation graph with c internal states and m output
states.
Before considering the formal semantics of RCGs, we first explain them
informally: An RCG (I,F,O) generates an infinite sequence of values by main-
taining |I| internal states that are initialized using I and updated using F.
Since the number of internal states of the RCG may be different from the
number of arguments that the target program takes, the RCG converts the |I|
internal states to |O| output states using O. As illustrated schematically in
Figure 2.3, we can generate the k’th value in the infinite sequence by applying
the update expression F exactly k times.
RCG semantics. More formally, the semantics of an RCG (I,F,O) is given
by the rules shown in Figure 2.4. Here, si[t] represents the i’th internal state at
time step t, and yi[t] corresponds to the i’th output value at time t. As shown
in Figure 2.4, si[0] is computed using the i’th initialization expression in I,
and si[t+ 1] is obtained from (s1[t], . . . , sc[t]) by applying the update function
Fi. Finally, yj[t] is obtained from the internal state at time t by applying
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si[0] = JIiK
si[t+ 1] = JFiK[s1 7→ s1[t], . . . , sc 7→ sc[t]]
yj[t] = JOjK[s1 7→ s1[t], . . . , sc 7→ sc[t]]
where 1 ≤ i ≤ c = |I| and 1 ≤ j ≤ m = |O|J(I,F,O)K = [(y1[t], . . . , ym(t)) | t ∈ [0,∞]]
Figure 2.4: RCG semantics
the output expression Oj to (s1[t], . . . , sc[t]). The semantics of the RCG is
then given by the infinite sequence of values (y1[t], . . . , ym[t]) for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Given an RCG G and a value y, we say that y is in the language of G, written
L(G), if y = (y1[t], . . . , ym[t]) for some time step t.
RCG expressions. Our definition of recurrent computation graphs inten-
tionally does not fix the expression language over which I,F,O are specified.
To maximize the flexibility of our approach, RCGs are parametrized by a set
of components C over which the initialization, update, and output expressions
are constructed. Recall that both F and O are functions, and their arguments
correspond to the RCG’s internal states. Hence, expressions e for F and O can
be generated according to the following grammar:
e := si | c | f(e1, . . . , ek)
where si represents the i’th internal state, c is a constant value, and f ∈
C is a function of arity k. Since initialization expressions are required to
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be constants, init follows a similar grammar except that we do not allow
initialization expressions to refer to the RCG’s internal states.
Example 2.3.1. The quickSort pattern from Section 2.2 can be expressed as
the following 2-state RCG using the components plus, append, prepend, inc,
as well as integer constants {0, 1, 2}.
I = (1, [0])
F = (plus(s1, 2), append(prepend(inc(s1), s2), s1))
O = s2
The first few iterations of the pattern’s evaluation are shown below,
where we use (B), (C), (+) to denote append, prepend, and plus respectively:
s1[0] = 1
s2[0] = [0]
s1[1] = 1 + 2 = 3
s2[1] = (inc(1) C [0]) B 1 = [2, 0, 1]
s1[2] = 3 + 2 = 5
s2[2] = (inc(3) C [2, 0, 1]) B 3)) = [4, 2, 0, 1, 3]
In the previous example, the output state was exactly the same as one
of the internal states. However, as illustrated by the following example, this
is not always the case:
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Example 2.3.2. Consider the following sequence of inputs: [ ], [1, 1], [1, 2, 1, 2],
[1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3], [1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 2, 3, 4], . . . This input pattern can be represented us-
ing the following RCG:
I = (0, [ ])
F = (plus(s1, 1), append(s2, s1))
O = concat(s2, s2)
Note that the output here is obtained by concatanating two copies of
the input state s2. For this example, there is no simple way to express this
pattern without distinguishing between internal and output states.
2.3.3 Algorithmic Vulnerability Testing as Discrete Optimization
We now formulate the algorithmic complexity vulnerability testing prob-
lem introduced earlier as an optimal program synthesis problem [29]. Towards
this goal, we first introduce the concept of a measurement model for assigning
scores to recurrent computation graphs:
Definition 5. (Ideal measurement model) Given an RCG G, an ideal
measurement model M maps G to a numeric value such that:
∀G,G′. (G  G′ →M(G) >M(G′)) (2.1)
In other words, an ideal measurement model M assigns a higher score
to G compared to G′ if G induces asymptotically worse behavior of the target
17
program compared to G′. Using this notion, we now formulate complexity
testing in terms of the following pattern optimization problem:
Definition 6. (Pattern Optimization) Given an ideal measurement model
M, the pattern optimization problem is to find an RCG that maximizes M,
i.e., find the solution of:
argmax
G
M(G) (2.2)
Because RCGs correspond to programs, Definition 6 is a form of optimal
program synthesis problem, where the goal is to maximize asymptotic resource
usage. The following theorem states that the pattern optimization problem is
equivalent to our definition of the algorithmic complexity vulnerability testing
problem:
Theorem 1. Eqn. 2.2 gives a solution to Definition 3.
Proof: Suppose pattern G satisfies Eqn. 2.2. If G is not a solution to
Definition 3, then we have some G′ such that G′  G. Using Eqn. 2.1, we
know that M(G′) >M(G), which means G is not the solution to Eqn. 2.2 (i.e.,
contradiction).
Theorem 1 is useful because it allows us to turn the algorithmic com-
plexity vulnerability testing problem into a discrete optimization problem,
assuming that we have access to an ideal measurement model M. However,
due to the black-box nature of our approach, M is difficult to obtain in prac-
tice. In particular, the ideal measurement model requires reasoning about the
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asymptotic resource usage of the program on all inputs of a given shape, but
this is clearly a very difficult static analysis problem. Thus, as a proxy to this
idealized metric, we instead estimate the quality of an input pattern by using
an empirical measurement model Mnˆ. Specifically, a measurement model Mnˆ
evaluates the quality of a generator G by running the input program P on
inputs up to size nˆ. In the remainder of this chapter, we use the following
empirical model as a proxy for Definition 5:
Definition 7. (Empirical Measurement Model) Our empirical measure-
ment model, denoted Mnˆ, evaluates an input pattern by returning the max-
imum resource usage among all inputs whose size does not exceed bound nˆ.
More formally:
Mnˆ(G) = max
x∈L(G)∧Σ(x)≤nˆ
Ψ(x) (2.3)
The following theorem states the conditions under which Mnˆ is a good
approximation of the ideal model:
Theorem 2. Mnˆ is an ideal measurement model (i.e., satisfies equation 2.1)
if nˆ is sufficiently large and we have:
lim
n→∞
Ψ(G≤n) =∞
Proof: We show that G  G′ implies Mnˆ(G)  Mnˆ(G′) under the con-
ditions stated in the theorem. Suppose G  G′. From Definition 2, this means
there exists n1 such that ∀n ≥ n1. Ψ(G≤n) > Ψ(G′≤n). Because we assume
all patterns’ resource usage increase to infinity as the input size grows, we
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can show that there exists some n2 such that ∀n ≥ n2.Mn(G) = Ψ(G≤n)
and Mn(G′) = Ψ(G′≤n) using Eqn. 2.3. Thus, for nˆ ≥ max(n1, n2), we have
Mnˆ(G) >Mnˆ(G′).
2.3.4 Genetic Programming
We now describe a genetic programming (GP) algorithm for solving
the discrete optimization problem from Section 2.3.3. We first present the
top-level algorithm and then explain its subroutines.
Our pattern maximization algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1
and follows the typical structure of genetic programming. Specifically, we
start with a randomly-generated initial population of RCGs (lines 2-3) and
repeatedly create a new population by combining the fittest individuals from
the old population.
To create a new population pop’, we create m new RCGs by combining
individuals from the existing population pop — this corresponds to the for
loop at lines 6-14. A new individual G is created by randomly choosing a
genetic operator op (line 7) and combining op.arity individuals from the current
population. While there are several different techniques that can be used
to select individuals from the population, our algorithm uses the so-called
deterministic tournament method (lines 8-9). Specifically, we sample K RCGs
and choose the RCG with the best fitness as the winner. 1
1K is a hyper-parameter called tournament size and controls the evolution pressure of
the GP process: When K is set to 1, there is no evolution pressure and all individuals
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Algorithm 1 Pattern Maximization using GP
Input: gpOps - the set of generic operators to use
Input: m - population size
Input: K - tournament size
Input: nˆ - size bound for performance measurement.
Input: µ, α - hyper-parameters used for calculating fitness
Output: the pattern with the highest fitness score so far
1: procedure FindOptimalRCG(gpOps,m, K, nˆ, µ, α)
2: pop ← initPopulation(m)
3: best ← findBest(pop)
4: while not converged() do
5: pop’ ← ∅
6: for i from 1 to m do
7: op ← randomPick(gpOps)
8: for j from 1 to op.arity do
9: argsj ← tournament(pop, K)
10: G ← op(args)
11: G.fitness ← Mnˆ(G) · e−(size(G)/µ)4 · αcost(G)
12: if G.fitness > best.fitness then
13: best ← G
14: pop’ ← pop’ ∪ {G}
15: pop ← pop’
16: return best
Given the new RCG G created at line 10, we evaluate G’s fitness (line
11) using a fitness function that we discuss in more detail later. If G is fitter
than the previously fittest RCG, we then update best to be G. The algorithm
terminates with solution best if there has been no fitness improvement on best
for many generations (line 4).
from the population, regardless of their fitness, have the same chance to be picked by the
tournament method; hence, in this case, GP degenerates to random search. When K is
set to the size of the whole population, only the best individual of each population can be
selected to participate in the creation of new individuals.
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Figure 2.5: Mutation operator
The genetic operators used in Algorithm 1 are described as follows:
Mutation operator. The mutation operator is used to maintain di-
versity from one generation to the next and prevents the algorithm from con-
verging on a local – rather than global – optimum. It creates an RCG G′ from
an existing RCG G by applying modifications to a node in the abstract-syntax
tree (AST) representation of G. Specifically, we first randomly choose an ini-
tialization, update, or output expression e and then select a random node n,
called the mutation point, in e. Our mutation operator then replaces the sub-
tree T rooted at n with a randomly generated AST with the same type as T .
Figure 2.5 illustrates this process.
Crossover operator. The crossover operator is used to combine existing
members of a population into new individuals. Specifically, given RCGs G1
and G2, we choose a mutation point n1 of type τ in G1 as well as another
mutation point n2 of the same type τ from G2. We then create two new RCGs
by swapping the sub-trees rooted at n1 and n2 and randomly pick one of the
two new RCGs. The crossover operation is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: Crossover operator
Reproduction operator. The reproduction operator is just an identity func-
tion – it simply copies the selected individual into the next generation. Re-
production is used to maintain stability between generations by preserving the
fittest individuals.
ConstFold operator. The ConstFold operator is similar to reproduction
except that it also performs light-weight constant folding on the AST. Using
ConstFold allows continuous evolution of constants used in the RCGs without
growing total AST size.
2.3.5 Fitness Function
Since our goal is to find an RCG that maximizes the target program’s
resource usage, the simplest implementation of the fitness function simply uses
the measurement model M. However, as standard in genetic programming,
the fitness function does not have to be exactly the same as the optimization
objective. We design our fitness function to have the following three properties:
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1. It should be consistent with the measurement model M, meaning that G is
considered fitter than G′ if M(G) >M(G′).
2. It should prevent individuals from evolving to unboundedly large programs
by penalizing RCGs with very large AST size.
3. When two RCGs have similar size and resource usage, it should use the
Occam’s razor principle to prefer the simpler one.
Based on these criteria, our fitness function F is defined as follows:
F (G) = Mnˆ(G) · e−(size(G)/µ)4 · αcost(G)
where size measures the total AST size of G, and cost is a measure of the
complexity of the RCG 2. Both µ and α are tunable hyper-parameters. Specif-
ically, µ is used for bloat control: If the AST size of G is smaller than µ, then
e−(size(G)/µ)
4
is close to 1; but, when size(G) > µ, the fitness quickly decays to 0.
The hyper-parameter α must be chosen as a value less than 1 and determines
the penalty factor associated with complexity.
2.4 Implementation
We have implemented the proposed method in a tool called Singu-
larity, which consists of approximately 6,000 lines of Scala code. In what
2We define complexity in terms of the constants used in the RCG. Intuitively, the larger
the constants used in the RCG, the higher the cost.
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follows, we discuss important design and implementation choices underlying
Singularity.
Resource usage measurement. Recall that our problem definition and
fitness evaluation function use a resource measurement function Ψ. We imple-
ment Ψ by counting the number of executed instructions rather than measuring
absolute running time, as the latter strategy is too noisy due to factors such
as cache warm-up, context switching, garbage collection etc.
To measure the executed number of instructions, we perform static
instrumentation using the Soot framework [179] for Java programs and the
LLVM framework [104] for C/C++ programs. In more detail, we initialize
an integer counter when the application starts and increment it by one after
each instruction. Our implementation also provides a lighter-weight version
of this instrumentation that only increments the counter at method entry
points and loop headers. In practice, we found this alternative strategy to
work quite well, as it strikes a good balance between precision and overhead.
Unless stated otherwise, all of our benchmarks are instrumented using this
lightweight strategy.
RCG components. Recall from Section 2.3.2 that our recurrent computa-
tion graphs are parametrized by a set of components that are used to construct
expressions. Our implementation comes with a library of such components for
most built-in types and collections. For instance, the component library for
integers include methods such as inc, dec, plus, minus, times, mod etc. Sim-
ilarly, for lists, we have generic components such as append, prepend, access,
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concat, length and so forth. For graphs, we have components that repre-
sent empty graphs as well as operations that add nodes and edges. Since our
framework is generic and extensible, the user can also define new components
for custom data types.
Parameter tuning. As mentioned earlier, genetic programming algorithms
have many tunable parameters such as population size, tournament size, thresh-
old µ and cost penalty factor α used in the fitness function etc. Unfortunately,
these parameters are often hard to configure manually due to the complex dy-
namics of genetic programming and the intricate interaction between different
parameters. To address this problem, we developed an automatic parameter
generator which samples these parameters from a joint distribution. When we
run Singularity multiple times on a problem, we always use different param-
eter sets sampled from this joint distribution. In our experience, this strategy
increases the likelihood that Singularity will find the desired worst-case
pattern.
2.5 Evaluation
To evaluate the usefulness of Singularity, we design a series of ex-
periments that are intended to address the following questions:
1. Is Singularity useful for revealing the worst-case complexity of a given
program?
2. How does Singularity compare with state-of-the-art testing tools that
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Algorithm Name Best Case Worst Case Found Worst?
Optimized Insertion Sort Θ(n) Θ(n2) 3
Quick Sort Θ(n log n) Θ(n2) 3
Optimized Quick Sort Θ(n log n) Θ(n2) 3
3-way Quick Sort Θ(n log n) Θ(n2) 3
Sequential Search Θ(1) Θ(n) 3
Binary Search Θ(1) Θ(log n) 3
Binary Search Tree Lookup Θ(1) Θ(n) 3
Red-Black Tree Lookup Θ(1) Θ(log n) 3
Separate Chaining Hash Table Lookup Θ(1) Θ(n) 3
Linear Probing Hash Table Lookup Θ(1) Θ(n) 3
NFA regex match Θ(m+ n) Θ(mn) 3
Booyer-Moore substring search Θ(m+ n) Θ(mn) 3
Prim Minimum Spanning Tree Θ(V + E) Θ(E log V ) 3
Bellman-Ford shortest path Θ(1) Θ(V (V + E)) 3
Dijkstra shortest path Θ(1) Θ(E log V ) 3
Bipartite matching (alternating path) Θ(V ) Θ(V (V + E)) 3
Bipartite matching (Hopcroft-Karp) Θ(V ) Θ(E
√
V ) 7
Table 2.1: Evaluation on textbook algorithms.
address the same problem?
3. Is Singularity useful for detecting algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities
and performance bugs in real world systems?
Unless stated otherwise, experiments are conducted on an Intel Xeon(R)
computer with an E5-1620 v3 CPU and 64G of memory running on Ubuntu
16.04.
2.5.1 Asymptotic Bound Analysis
In this section, we evaluate Singularity on standard algorithms taken
from a widely-used algorithms textbook by Sedgewick and Wayne [153]. The
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goal of this experiment is to determine whether Singularity can identify the
worst-case asymptotic complexity of a wide range of algorithms that operate
over different data structures.
We use the following methodology for selecting algorithms on which to
evaluate Singularity: First, to ensure that the benchmarks are not trivial,
we only focus on algorithms whose worst-case complexity is different from
their best-case behavior. Second, we only focus on algorithms whose worst-
case input is known to us. Third, we only select algorithms that are related to
sorting, search, graphs, and string matching. Overall, we obtain a total of 17
algorithms and evaluate Singularity on the corresponding implementation
from the textbook website [152]. For each algorithm, we run Singularity
for three hours, restarting the fuzzer with a different random seed whenever
the fitness metric stays unchanged for more than 150 generations. Finally, we
determine worst-case complexity by using the input patterns that maximize
resource usage at nˆ = 250.
The results of this experiments are summarized in Table 2.1. The first
three columns of this table provide the name of the algorithm along with its
corresponding best-case and worst-case asymptotic performance, and the final
column shows whether Singularity is able to trigger the expected worst-case
complexity. To obtain the data shown in the last column, we fit a curve through
data points (x, y) where the x-value represents the theoretical worst case and
the y-value corresponds to the actual performance metric of the pattern. If
the fitted curve shows a linear trend with the R2 metric being no less than
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0.95, we conclude that Singularity is able to generate the desired inputs
that cause worst-case behavior. 3
As we can see from this table, Singularity can trigger the worst-case
behavior of these algorithms in 16 of the 17 cases (i.e., 94% of our benchmarks).
For the remaining benchmark (i.e., Hopcroft-Karp bipartite matching), the
inputs generated by Singularity trigger O(V + E) complexity rather than
the expected O(E
√
V ) complexity. For this algorithm, the worst-case pattern
is quite tricky to construct [115] and cannot be represented using our simple
DSL for manipulating graphs.
2.5.2 Comparison Against SlowFuzz
In our next experiment, we compare Singularity against Slow-
Fuzz [133], a state-of-the-art fuzzing tool for finding availability vulnerabil-
ities. Similar to our approach, SlowFuzz performs resource-usage-guided
evolutionary search but generates concrete inputs, as opposed to input pat-
terns, that maximize resource usage.
We compare Singularity with SlowFuzz in terms of scalability as
well as the quality of the generated inputs. We assess scalability by running
each tool on increasing input sizes ranging from 64 bytes to 2K bytes. To
evaluate the quality of the result, we run each tool 30 times (with a 2-hour
time limit on each run) and pick the inputs I, I ′ from Singularity and
3In addition, we also manually inspect the data to further confirm there is a good linear
fit.
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SlowFuzz that cause the target program to run the longest time. We then
compare the running time of the corresponding program on I and I ′.
We perform this experiment on the same set of benchmarks reported
in the SlowFuzz paper [133]. These benchmarks include several sorting al-
gorithms from different libraries, a hash table implementation from PHP, 19
regular expression matching problems, and a zip utility from the bzip2 ap-
plication. We do not use the bzip2 example in our evaluation since the vul-
nerability is triggered only when certain bits in the input file header are set;
hence, this benchmark is not related to the input pattern generation problem
addressed in this chapter. Due to the heavy computational workload required
for this experiment, we run both tools on an HPC cluster with Intel Xeon Phi
7250 CPU (68 cores at 1.4GHz) and 96G RAM running CentOS 6.3.
��������
64 128 256 512 1024 2048
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
100
Fuzzing Size
U
sa
ge
R
at
io
Geometric Mean Weighted Geometric Mean
Figure 2.7: Comparison against SlowFuzz
The usage ratio represents the ratio between the worst case resource usage found
by Singularity and by SlowFuzz. Thus, a ratio greater than 1 indicates that
Singularity triggers higher resource usage. We display both the weighted and
unweighted geometric mean of these ratios over the entire benchmark set.
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Since this experiment involves 27 benchmarks and 6 different config-
urations (one for each input size), we report the aggregate results across all
benchmarks for each input size. For each benchmark b and input size n, we
use the inputs I, I ′ generated by Singularity and SlowFuzz to compute
the following usage ratio rnb :
rnb =
Ψb(I)
Ψb(I ′)
where Ψb(I) denotes the running time (in terms of instruction count) of bench-
mark b on input I. Observe that rnb > 1 indicates that Singularity outper-
forms SlowFuzz (i.e., Singularity-generated inputs cause worse perfor-
mance).
To aggregate over all benchmarks for each input size, we consider two
different metrics:
• Geometric mean: For each input size s and benchmarks b1, . . . , bk, we com-
pute the geometric mean, denoted GM(rnb1 , . . . , r
n
bk
), of ratios rnb1 , . . . , r
n
bk
.
• Weighted geometric mean: Since the usage ratio rnb is close to 1 for about
half of the benchmarks, the geometric mean does not convey the full story.
Thus, we also compute the following weighted geometric mean:
WGM(rnb1 , . . . , r
n
bk
) = exp
(∑k
i=1 ln(r
n
bi
)3∑k
i=1 ln(r
n
bi
)2
)
Intuitively, this weighted geometric mean assigns a weight close to 0 to all
ratios that are close to 1 and a higher weight to those where there is a
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Benchmark Description Input Type DSL Used Input budget Target time AV found?
blogger Blogging web application URL string 5KB 300s 3
graphAnalyzer DOT to PNG/PS converter DOT file graph 5KB 3600s 3
imageProcessor Image classifier PNG file array 70KB 1080s 3
textCrunchr Text analyzer text file string 400KB 300s 7
linearAlgebra Matrix computation service Matrix array 15.25KB 230s 3
airplan1 Online airline scheduler Graph graph 25KB 500s 3
airplan2 Online airline scheduler Graph graph 25KB 500s 3
airplan3 Online airline scheduler Graph graph 25KB 500s 7
searchableBlog Webpage search engine Matrix array 1KB 10s 3
braidit1 Online multiplayer game String string 2KB 300s 3
Table 2.2: Evaluation on STAC Benchmarks.
significant performance difference. 4
The results of this comparison are summarized in Figure 2.7, where the
left bar in each size group shows the geometric mean and the right bar indi-
cates the weighted geometric mean. We can observe two main trends based
on this figure: First, Singularity is able to generate inputs that cause the
applications to run significantly longer within the time frame, showing that
Singularity is more efficient than SlowFuzz in terms of fuzzing efficiency.
Second, the performance ratios grow as n increases, showing that Singular-
ity scales better compared to SlowFuzz. Hence, these results highlight the
scalability advantage of pattern fuzzing over concrete input fuzzing.
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2.5.3 Availability Vulnerability Detection
To demonstrate that Singularity can generate inputs that exercise
non-trivial algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities, we evaluate Singularity
on ten benchmarks from the DARPA STAC program. Specifically, we choose
exactly those benchmarks that (a) exhibit an availability vulnerability, and (b)
where it is possible to construct an exploit using a malicious input pattern.
In more detail, each STAC benchmark is a Java application containing
between 500 to 20,000 lines of code. Furthermore, each benchmark comes with
a pre-defined input budget b and a target running time t such that the goal
is to craft an attack vector that causes the running time of the application to
exceed t using an input of size at most b. Table 2.2 provides more detailed
information about these STAC benchmarks.
To perform this experiment, we run Singularity for a total of three
hours on each benchmark. If the specified input budget b is below some thresh-
old, we parametrize the measurement model with b; otherwise, we use a default
size of nˆ = 1KB.
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 2.2. At a high
level, Singularity is able to generate the desired attack vector for eight out
of these ten benchmarks. In particular, given a benchmark with input budget
4Like the geometric mean, this metric is fair because if we switch Singularity and
SlowFuzz (i.e., replace rnbi with 1/r
n
bi
for all i), WGM( ~rn) becomes 1/WGM( ~rn). Many
other common averaging functions (e.g., arithmetic or quadratic mean) do not have this
property.
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b and target running time t, Singularity can find inputs of size at most b
that cause the application to exceed the specified time t.
To understand the limitations of Singularity, we manually investi-
gate the textCrunchr and airplan3 benchmarks for which Singularity fails
to find an attack vector. For textCrunchr, the root cause of the problem is
the empirical measurement model. In particular, Singularity evaluates the
fitness of an individual based on its performance on inputs with size 1KB,
but since this is much smaller than the input budget of 400KB, our empiri-
cal measurement model does not end up being an ideal one. While we could
circumvent this problem by using a much larger input size, this would sig-
nificantly increase the time to evaluate the fitness of a given input pattern,
thereby slowing down the fuzzing algorithm.
For the airplan3 benchmark, the reason Singularity fails to find the
desired attack vector is the three hour time limit. In particular, running the
application on an input of size of 1KB takes more than 3 minutes after roughly
90 generations of the GP algorithm; thus, Singularity does not converge to
the fittest input pattern within the provided time limit.
2.5.4 Performance Bug Detection
In addition to vulnerability detection, Singularity can also help with
discovering unknown performance bugs in real-world projects. These perfor-
mance bugs do not correspond to any vulnerability since they reside in general-
purpose libraries that are not directly related to any security-critical applica-
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tions, but finding them is still as hard as finding zero-day vulnerabilities. We
run Singularity on three popular Java libraries, namely Google Guava [76],
Vavr [182], and JGraphT [91]. All of these libraries have more than 1000 stars
on Github and are used by more than 70 other projects on Maven Central.
Hence, any performance issue in these libraries is likely to have significant
real-world impact.
For each library, we manually identify APIs that are related to contain-
ers or graphs, and write driver code to invoke these APIs with data generated
by Singularity. We then use the input patterns generated by Singularity
to determine worst-case complexity by (a) generating inputs of different sizes,
and (b) fitting a curve through these data points. If the complexity reported by
Singularity does not match the expected worst-case, we manually inspect
the code to determine whether there is a performance bug.
Using this methodology, we identified five previously unknown perfor-
mance bugs, all of which have been confirmed by the developers. In what
follows, we include brief descriptions of the performance problems uncovered
by Singularity:
Performance bugs in Guava. Singularity identified two performance
bugs in the ImmutableBiMap and
ImmutableSet container classes in the Guava library. Specifically, both of
these classes provide a method called copyOf that returns an ImmutableBiMap
or
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ImmutableSet that contains the same elements as the input collection. While
both of these copyOf methods are expected to take linear time, the inputs
generated by Singularity cause O(n2) performance. In particular, Singu-
larity triggers this worst-case behavior by causing hash collisions despite the
existence of a mechanism that tries to protect against hash collisions. The in-
puts generated by Singularity are complex enough to bypass these existing
mitigation mechanisms. Both of these performance bugs have been acknowl-
edged by the developers and already been fixed.
Performance bug in JGraphT Singularity identified a serious perfor-
mance bug in the JGraphT implementation of the push-relabel maximum flow
algorithm [74]. While the theoretical worst-case behavior of this algorithm is
O(n3), Singularity is able to find inputs that trigger O(n5) running time.
The developers have acknowledged this bug and are currently investigating its
root cause.
Performance bug in Vavr Singularity also identified two performance
problems in the Vavr library that provides immutable and persistent collec-
tions. In particular, while the addAll and union methods of LinkedHashSet
are supposed to have worst-case linear complexity, Singularity found inputs
that trigger quadratic behavior. The developers have acknowledged this issue
and added a caveat to the corresponding JavaDocs that these methods have
quadratic rather than the (expected) linear complexity.
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Chapter 3
Relational Verification for Non-Interference
The technique that we described in Chapter 2 is useful not only for
uncovering performance problems, but also for detecting security vulnerabili-
ties related to algorithmic complexity [25, 185, 43, 116, 117, 192]. Such type
of vulnerabilities typically affect the availability of an application. However,
the same techniques from the previous chapter is insufficient to address a
related class of security vulnerabilities that affects the application’s confiden-
tiality. For example, consider a program whose complexity is Θ(n2) if some
secret value has a certain property, but Θ(n) otherwise. Such an imbalance
in running time corresponds to a confidentiality leak, as an attacker can eas-
ily make inferences about confidential values based on how long the program
takes to run. This type of vulnerabiliteis is known as side-channel vulnera-
bilities, which continue to be uncovered on a regular basis in security-critical
systems [32, 181, 78, 5]. Even though they are at least as important as com-
plexity vulnerabilities, techniques from previous chapter cannot be used to
detect them.
0Portions of this chapter have been published in CCS 2017 [37]. Jia contributed to
all aspects of the design, implementation, and evaluation of the core calculus used in this
chapter.
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In this chapter, we show how to automatically verify whether there
exists any potential side-channel vulnerability for a given application.
3.1 Overview
Our goal here is to help programmers develop side-channel-free appli-
cations by automatically analyzing correlations between variations in resource
usage and differences in security-sensitive data. In particular, given a program
P and a “tolerable” resource deviation , we would like to verify that the re-
source usage of P does not vary by more than  no matter what the value of
the secret. Following the terminology of Goguen and Meseguer [73], we refer
to this property as -bounded non-interference. Intuitively, a program that vi-
olates -bounded non-interference for even large values of  exhibits significant
secret-induced differences in resource usage and therefore has a side-channel
vulnerability.
The problem of verifying -bounded non-interference is challenging for
at least two reasons: First, the property that we would like to verify is an
instance of a so-called 2-safety property [176] that requires reasoning about all
possible interactions between pairs of program executions. Said differently, a
witness to the violation of -bounded interference consists of a pair of program
runs on two different secrets. As mentioned in section 1.1, checking 2-safety is
known to be a much harder problem than checking standard safety properties
(for which many automated tool exists).
In this chapter, we solve these challenges by combining relatively lightweight
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static taint analysis with more precise relational verification techniques for
reasoning about k-safety (i.e., properties that concern interactions between k
program runs). Specifically, our approach first uses taint information to iden-
tify so-called hot spots, which are program fragments that have the potential
to exhibit a secret-induced imbalance in resource usage. We then use much
more precise relational reasoning techniques to automatically verify that such
hot spots do not violate -bounded non-interference.
At the core of our technique is a new program logic called Quantitative
Cartesian Hoare Logic (QCHL) for verifying the -bounded non-interference
property. QCHL leverages recent advances in relational verification by build-
ing on top of Cartesian Hoare Logic (CHL) [170] for verifying k-safety prop-
erties. Specifically, QCHL allows us to prove triples of the form 〈φ〉 S 〈ψ〉,
where S is a program fragment and φ, ψ are first-order formulas that relate
the program’s resource usage (e.g., execution time) between an arbitrary pair
of program runs. Starting with the precondition that two runs have the same
public input but different values of the secret, QCHL proof rules allow us to
prove that the difference in resource usage is bounded from above by some
(user-provided) constant . Similar to CHL, our QCHL logic allows effective
relational verification by symbolically executing two copies of the program in
lockstep. However, QCHL differs from CHL in that it reasons about the pro-
gram’s resource usage behavior and exploits domain-specific assumptions to
improve both analysis precision and scalability. Furthermore, since the QCHL
proof rules are deterministic (modulo an oracle for finding loop invariants and
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1 BigInteger modPow(BigInteger base,
2 BigInteger exponent, BigInteger modulus) {
3 BigInteger s = BigInteger.valueOf(1);
4 // BigInteger r;
5 int width = exponent.bitLength();
6 for (int i = 0; i < width; i++) {
7 s = s.multiply(s).mod(modulus);
8 if(exponent.testBit(width - i - 1))
9 s = s.multiply(base).mod(modulus);
10 //else r = s.multiply(base).mod(modulus);
11 }
12 return s;
13 }
Figure 3.1: Gabfeed code snippet that contains a timing side channel
A possible fix can be obtained by commenting in lines 4 and 10.
{
"epsilon":"0",
"costModel":"time",
"secrets": [ "<com.cyberpointllc.stac.auth.KeyExchangeServer:
java.math.BigInteger secretKey>" ]
}
Figure 3.2: Themis configuration file for Gabfeed.
proving standard Hoare triples), QCHL immediately lends itself to a fully
automated verification algorithm.
3.2 Motivating Example
Suppose that Bob, a security analyst at a government agency, receives
a Java web application called Gabfeed, which implements a web forum that
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allows community members to post and search messages1. In this context,
both the user names and passwords are considered confidential and are there-
fore encrypted before being stored in the database. Bob’s task is to vet this
application and verify that it does not contain timing side-channel vulnera-
bilities that may compromise user name or password information. However,
Gabfeed contains around 30,000 lines of application code (not including any
libraries); hence, manually searching for a vulnerability in the application is
akin to finding a needle in the haystack.
A security analyst like Bob can greatly benefit from Themis by using
it to automatically verify the absence of side-channel vulnerabilities in the
target application. To use Themis, Bob first identifies application-specific
confidential data (in this case, secretKey) and annotates them as such in a
Themis-specific configuration file, as shown in Figure 3.2. In the same con-
figuration file, Bob also tells Themis the type of side channel to look for (in
this case, timing) by specifying the costModel field and provides a reasonable
value of , using the epsilon field. Here, Bob wants to be conservative and
initially sets the value of  to zero.
Using the information provided by Bob in the configuration file, Themis
first performs static taint analysis to identify methods that are dependent on
confidential data. In this case, one of the methods that access confidential
1Gabfeed is one of the challenge problems from the DARPA STAC project. Please
see http://www.darpa.mil/program/space-time-analysis-for-cybersecurity for more details
about the STAC project.
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data is modPow, shown in Figure 3.1. Specifically, Themis determines that the
second argument (exponent) of modPow is tainted and marks it as a “hot spot”
that should be analyzed more precisely using relational verification techniques.
In the next phase, Themis uses its Quantitative Cartesian Hoare Logic
(QCHL) verifier to analyze modPow in more detail. Specifically, the QCHL
verifier considers two executions of modPow that have the same values of base
and modulus but that differ in the value of exponent. In this case, the QCHL
verifier fails to prove that the resource usage of any such two runs is identical
and therefore issues a warning about a possible timing side channel in the
modPow procedure.
Next, Bob wonders whether the imbalance in resource usage is large
enough to be actually exploitable in practice. For this reason, he plays around
with different values of the bound , gradually increasing it to larger and larger
constants. In the case of timing side channels,  represents the difference in
the executed number of Java bytecode instructions. However, no matter what
value of  Bob picks, Themis complains about a possible timing side channel.
This observation indeed makes sense because the difference in resource usage
is proportional to the secret and can therefore not be bounded by a constant.
Bob now inspects the source code of modPow and realizes that a possi-
ble vulnerability arises due to the resource imbalance in the secret-dependent
branch from line 8. To fix the vulnerability, Bob adds the code from lines 4
and 10, with the goal of ensuring that the timing behavior of the program
is not dependent on exponent. To confirm that his fix is valid, Bob now
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runs Themis one more time and verifies that his repair eliminates the original
vulnerability.
In this section, we formally present the problem as well as out solution.
3.3 Threat Model
We assume that an adversary can observe a program’s total resource
usage, such as timing, memory, and response size. When measuring resource
usage, we further assume that any variations are caused at the application soft-
ware level. Hence, side channels caused by the microarchitecture such as cache
contention [188] and branch prediction [2] are out of the scope of this work.
Physical side channels (including power and electromagnetic radiation [69])
can, in principle, be handled by our our system as long as a precise model of
the corresponding resource usage is given. We assume that the attacker is not
able to observe anything else about the program other than its resource usage.
One possible real-world setting in which the aforementioned assump-
tions hold could be that the attacker and the victim are connected through a
network, and the victim runs a server or P2P software that interacts with other
machines through encrypted communications. In this scenario, the attacker
and the victim are physically separated; hence, the attacker cannot exploit
physical side channels, such as power usage. Furthermore, the attacker does
not have a co-resident process or VM running on the victim’s machine, thus
it is hard to passively observe or actively manipulate OS and hardware-level
side channels. What the attacker can do is to either interact with the server
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and measure the time it takes for the server to respond, or observe the net-
work traffic and measure request and response sizes. In our setting, we assume
that data encryption has been properly implemented and the attacker cannot
directly read the contents of any packet.
3.4 Side-Channels and Bounded Non-interference
In this section, we introduce the property of -bounded non-interference,
which is the security policy that will be subsequently verified using the Themis
system.
Let P be a program that takes a list of input values ~a, and let RP (~a)
denote the resource usage of P on input ~a. Following prior work in the litera-
ture [77, 148, 67], we assume that each input is marked as either high or low,
where high inputs denote security-sensitive data and low inputs denote public
data. Let ~ah (resp. ~al) be the sublist of the inputs that are marked as high
(resp. low). Prior work in the literature [176, 55, 6] considers a program to
be side-channel-free if the following condition is satisfied:
Definition 3.4.1. A program P is free of resource-related side-channel vul-
nerabilities if
∀~a1, ~a2. (~a1l = ~a2l ∧ ~a1h 6= ~a2h)⇒ RP (~a1) = RP (~a2)
The above definition, which is a direct adaptation of the classical notion
of non-interference [73], states that a program is free of side channels if the
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resource usage of the program is deterministic with respect to the public inputs.
In other words, the program’s resource usage does not correlate with any of
its secret inputs.
3.4.1 Language
One of the key technical contributions of this chapter is a new method
for verifying -bounded non-interference using QCHL, a variant of Cartesian
Hoare Logic introduced in recent work for verifying k-safety [170]. QCHL
proves triples of the form 〈φ〉 S 〈ψ〉, where S is a program fragment and
φ, ψ are first-order formulas that relate the program’s resource usage between
an arbitrary pair of program runs. Starting with the precondition that the
program’s low inputs are the same for a pair of program runs, QCHL tries to
derive a post-condition that logically implies -bounded non-interference.
We will describe our program logic, QCHL, using the simplified im-
perative language shown in Figure 3.3. In this language, program inputs
are annotated as high or low, indicating private and public data respectively.
Atomic statements include skip (i.e., a no-op), assignments of the form x := e,
and consume statements, where “consume(e)”indicates the consumption of e
units of resource. Our language also supports standard control-flow constructs,
including sequential composition, if statements, and loops.
Figure 3.4 defines the cost-instrumented operational semantics of this
language using judgments of the form Γ ` S : Γ′, r. The meaning of this judg-
ment is that, assuming we execute S under environment Γ (mapping variables
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〈expr〉 ::= 〈const〉 | 〈var〉 | 〈expr〉 ◦ 〈expr〉
(◦ ∈ {+,−,×,∨,∧, ...})
〈stmt〉 ::= skip | consume(〈expr〉) | 〈var〉 := 〈expr〉
〈stmts〉 ::= 〈stmt〉 | 〈stmt〉; 〈stmts〉
| if 〈expr〉 then 〈stmts〉 else 〈stmts〉
| while 〈expr〉 do 〈stmts〉
〈params〉 ::= 〈param〉 | 〈param〉, 〈params〉
〈param〉 ::= 〈annot〉 〈var〉
〈annot〉 ::= low | high
〈prog〉 ::= λ〈params〉. 〈stmts〉
Figure 3.3: Language used in our formalization
to values), then S consumes r units of resource and the new environment is
Γ′. As shown in Figure 3.4, we use the notation RP (~a) to denote the resource
usage of program P on input vector ~a. In cases where the resource usage is
irrelevant, we simply omit the cost and write Γ ` S : Γ′.
3.4.2 QCHL Proof Rules
We now turn our attention to the proof rules of Quantitative Cartesian
Hoare Logic (QCHL), which forms the basis of our verification methodology.
Similar to CHL [170], QCHL is a relational program logic that allows proving
relationships between multiple runs of the program. However, unlike CHL,
QCHL is concerned with proving properties about the difference in resource
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P = λ~p.S ∀pi ∈ ~p. Γ(pi) = ai Γ ` S : Γ′, r
RP (~a) = r
S = skip
Γ ` S : Γ, 0
S = (x := e) Γ ` e : v Γ′ = Γ[x← v]
Γ′ ` S : Γ′, 0
S = consume (e) Γ ` e : v
Γ ` S : Γ, v
S = S1;S2
Γ ` S1 : Γ1, r1
Γ1 ` S2 : Γ2, r2
Γ ` S : Γ2, r1 + r2
S = if e then S1 else S2
Γ ` e : true
Γ ` S1 : Γ′, r′
Γ ` S : Γ′, r′
S = if e then S1 else S2
Γ ` e : false
Γ ` S2 : Γ′, r′
Γ ` S : Γ′, r′
S = while e do S′ Γ ` e : false
Γ ` S : Γ, r
S = while e do S′
Γ ` e : true
Γ ` S′ : Γ1, r1
Γ1 ` S : Γ2, r2
Γ ` S : Γ2, r1 + r2
Figure 3.4: Rules for computing resource usage
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usage across multiple runs. Towards this goal, QCHL performs cost instru-
mentation and explicitly tracks the program’s resource usage. Furthermore,
since our goal is to prove the specific property of -bounded non-interference,
QCHL exploits domain-specific assumptions by incorporating taint informa-
tion into the proof rules. Finally, since the QCHL proof rules we describe
here are deterministic, our program logic can be immediately translated into
a verification algorithm (modulo an oracle for providing loop invariants and
proving standard Hoare triples).
Figure 3.5 presents the proof rules of QCHL. Here, all proof rules,
with the exception of Rule (0), derive judgments of the form Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S1 ~
S2 〈Ψ〉, where S1 and S2 contain a disjoint set of variables and Σ is a taint
environment mapping variables to a taint value drawn from the set {low, high}
. The notation S1 ~ S2 describes a program that is semantically equivalent to
S1;S2 but that is somehow easier to verify (because it tries to execute loops
from different executions in lock step). Hence, we have Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉
if {Φ}S1;S2{Ψ} is a valid Hoare triple. As we will see shortly, the taint
environment Σ is used as a way of increasing the precision and scalability of
the analysis. In the remainder of this section, we assume that Σ is sound, i.e., if
Σ(x) is low, then the value of x does not depend (either explicitly or implicitly)
on any high inputs. We now explain each of the rules from Figure 3.5 in more
detail.
The first rule labeled (0) corresponds to the top-level verification proce-
dure. If we can derive Σ ` SideChannelFree(P, ), then P obeys the -bounded
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non-interference property. In this rule, we use the notation Sτ to denote the
cost-instrumented version of S, defined as follows:
Definition 3.4.2. Given a program P = λ~p.S, its cost-instrumented version
is another program P τ obtained by instrumenting P with a counter variable
τ that tracks its resource usage. More formally, P τ = γ(P ) where the instru-
mentation procedure γ is defined as:
• γ(λ~p.S) = λ~p.(τ := 0; γ(S))
• γ(skip) = skip
• γ(x := e) = (x := e)
• γ(consume (e)) = (τ := τ + e)
• γ(S1;S2) = γ(S1); γ(S2)
• γ(if e then S1 else S2) =
if e then γ(S1) else γ(S2)
• γ(while e do S) = while e do γ(S)
Essentially, the program P τ is the same as P except that it contains
an additional variable τ that tracks the program’s resource usage. As stated
by the following lemma, our instrumentation is correct with respect to the
operational semantics from Figure 3.4.
Lemma 1. Let program P = λ~p.S and let P τ = λ~p.Sτ . We have
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- Sτ does not contain any consume statement.
- If Γ(~p) = ~a and Γ ` Sτ : Γ′, then RP (~a) = Γ′(τ).
Hence, rule (0) from Figure 3.5 instruments the original program λ~p. S
to obtain a new program λ~p. Sτ that uses a fresh variable τ to track the pro-
gram’s resource usage. Since bounded non-interference is a 2-safety property,
it then creates two α-renamed copies Sτ1 and S
τ
2 of S
τ that have no shared
variables and uses the remaining QCHL proof rules to derive a triple
〈~p1l = ~p2l ∧ ~p1h 6= ~p2h〉 Sτ1 ~ Sτ2 〈Ψ〉
If the post-condition Ψ logically implies |τ1− τ2| ≤ , we have a proof that the
program obeys bounded non-interference. Intuitively, this proof rule considers
an arbitrary pair of executions of S where the low inputs are the same and
tries to prove that the resource usage of the two runs differs by at most .
The remaining rules from Figure 3.5 derive QCHL triples of the form
〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉. Our verification algorithm applies these rules in the reverse
order shown in Figure 3.5. That is, we only use rule labeled i if no rule with
label j > i is applicable. Hence, unlike standard CHL, our verification method
does not perform backtracking search over the proof rules.
Let us now consider the remaining rules in more detail: Rule (1) is
the same as commutativity rule in CHL and states that the ~ operator is
symmetric. Intuitively, since S1 and S2 do not share variables, any interleaving
of S1 and S2 will yield the same result, and we can therefore commute the
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λ~p1.S
τ
1 = α(λ~p.S
τ )
λ~p2.S
τ
2 = α(λ~p.S
τ )
Φ = (~p1
l = ~p2
l ∧ ~p1h 6= ~p2h)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 Sτ1 ~ Sτ2 〈Ψ〉
|= Ψ→ |τ1 − τ2| ≤ 
(0)
Σ ` SideChannelFree(λ~p.S, )
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S2 ~ S1 〈Ψ〉
(1)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉
S 6= (S1;S2)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S; skip~ S′ 〈Ψ〉
(2)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S ~ S′ 〈Ψ〉
` {Φ} S1 {Φ′}
Σ ` 〈Φ′〉 S2 ~ S3 〈Ψ〉
S1 = skip ∨ S1 = (v := e)
(3)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S1;S2 ~ S3〈Ψ〉
` {Φ} S {Ψ}
(4)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S ~ skip 〈Ψ〉
Σ ` 〈Φ ∧ e〉 S1;S ~ S3〈Ψ1〉
Σ ` 〈Φ ∧ ¬e〉 S2;S ~ S3〈Ψ2〉
(5)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 if e then S1 else S2;S ~ S3〈Ψ1 ∨Ψ2〉
` {Φ}while e1 do S1{Φ′}
` {Φ′}while e2 do S2{Ψ′}
Σ ` 〈Ψ′〉 S ~ S′ 〈Ψ〉
(6)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 while e1 do S1;S ~while e2 do S2;S′〈Ψ〉
Σ ` CanSynchronize(e1, e2, S1, S2, I)
Σ ` 〈I ∧ e1 ∧ e2〉S1 ~ S2〈I ′〉
Σ ` 〈I ∧ ¬e1 ∧ ¬e2〉S ~ S′〈Ψ〉
|= Φ→ I |= I ′ → I
(7)
Σ ` 〈Φ〉 while e1 do S1;S ~while e2 do S2;S′〈Ψ〉
Figure 3.5: QCHL proof rules
The notation α(S) denotes an α-renamed version of statement S.
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two operands when deriving QCHL triples. As will become clear shortly,
the commutativity rule ensures that our verification algorithm makes progress
when none of the other rules are applicable.
The next rule states that we are free to append a skip statement to
any non-sequential statement without affecting its meaning. While this rule
may not seem very useful on its own, it allows us to avoid redundancies in the
proof system by bringing each S1 ~ S2 to a canonical form where S1 is always
of the form S;S ′ or S2 is skip.
Rule (3) specifies the verification logic for S1 ~ S2 when S1 is of the
form A;S where A is an atomic statement. In this case, we simply “consume”
A by deriving the Hoare triple {Φ}A{Φ′} and then use Φ′ as a precondition
for S ~ S2.
Rule (4) serves as the base case for our logic. When we want to prove
〈Φ〉 S ~ skip 〈Ψ〉, we immediately reduce this judgement to the standard
Hoare triple {Φ} S {Ψ} because skip is just a no-op.
Example. Suppose we want to prove (0-bounded) non-interference for
the following program:
λ( low x ) . consume ( x ) ; sk ip ;
First we apply transformation γ and get the resource instrumented
program:
λ( low x ) . τ=0; τ = τ + x ; sk ip ;
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Ignore the taint environment for now, as we will not use it in this
example. According to rule (0), we only need to prove
〈x1 = x2〉 τ1 = 0; τ1 = τ1 +x1; skip; ~ τ2 = 0; τ2 = τ2 +x2; skip; 〈τ1 = τ2〉
Applying rule (3) twice, we can reduce the above judgement to the following
one:
〈x1 = x2 ∧ τ1 = x1〉 skip; ~ τ2 = 0; τ2 = τ2 + x2; skip; 〈τ1 = τ2〉
Swapping the two operands of ~ with rule (1), we get
〈x1 = x2 ∧ τ1 = x1〉 τ2 = 0; τ2 = τ2 + x2; skip; ~ skip; 〈τ1 = τ2〉
After applying rule (4), we get
{x1 = x2 ∧ τ1 = x1} τ2 = 0; τ2 = τ2 + x2; skip; {τ1 = τ2}
Applying Hoare-style strongest postcondition computation, the above Hoare
triple can be reduced to
{x1 = x2 ∧ τ1 = x1 ∧ τ2 = x2} skip; {τ1 = τ2}
Since this Hoare triple is clearly valid, we have proven non-interference using
the QCHL proof rules.
Rule (5) specifies the general verification logic for branch statements.
This rule is an analog of the conditional rule in standard Hoare logic: we
can verify an if statement by embedding the branch condition e into the true
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e1 = α(e) e2 = α(e)
e1 ≡α e2
S1 = α(S) S2 = α(S)
S1 ≡α S2
e1 ≡α e2
S1 ≡α S2
Σ ` e1 : low
Σ ` e2 : low
Σ ` CanSynchronize(e1, e2, S1, S2, I)
|= I → (e1 ↔ e2)
Σ ` CanSynchronize(e1, e2, S1, S2, I)
Figure 3.6: Helper rules for figure 3.5
branch and its negation ¬e into the false branch and carry out the proof for
both branches accordingly.
Rule (6) specifies the general verification logic for loops. Without loss
of generality, this rule requires both sides of the ~ operator to be loops: If
one side is a not a loop, we can always apply one of the other rules, using rule
(1) to swap the loop to the other side if necessary. The idea here is to apply
self-composition [17]: we run the loop on the left-hand side first, followed by
the loop on the right-hand side, and try to derive the proof as if the two loops
are sequentially composed.
While rule (6) is sound, it is typically difficult to prove 2-safety using
rule (6) alone. In particular, rule (6) does not allow us to synchronize execu-
tions between the two loops, so the resulting Hoare triples are often hard to
verify. The following example illustrates this issue:
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Example. Consider the following code snippet:
λ( low n , low k ) .
i = 0 ;
whi l e ( i < n) {
consume ( i ) ; i = i + k ;
}
To prove that this program obeys -bounded non-interference, we need
to show that the difference in resource consumption after executing the two
copies of the loop is at most . However, to prove this property using rule (6),
we would need to infer a precise post-condition about resource consumption.
Unfortunately, this requires inferring a complex non-linear loop invariant in-
volving i, n, k. Since such loop invariants are difficult to infer, we cannot prove
non-interference using rule (6).
Rule (7) is one of the most important rules underlying QCHL, as it
allows us to execute loops from different executions in lockstep. This loop can
be applied only when the CanSynchronize predicate is true, meaning that the
two loops are guaranteed to execute the same number of times. The definition
of the CanSynchronize predicate is shown in Figure 3.6: Given two loops
L1 ≡ while(e1) do S1 and L2 ≡ while(e2) do S2, and a loop invariant I for the
“fused” loop while(e1∧e2) do S1;S2, CanSynchronize determines if L1 and L2
must execute the same number of times. In the easy case, this information can
be determined using only taint information: Specifically, suppose that L1, L2
are identical modulo variable renaming and e1, e2 contains only untainted (low)
variables. Since we prove bounded non-interference under the assumption that
low variables from the two runs have the same value, this assumption implies
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L1 and L2 must execute the same number of times. If we cannot prove the
CanSynchronize predicate using taint information alone, we may still be able
to prove it using the invariant I for the fused loop. Specifically, if I logically
implies e1 ↔ e2, we know that after each iteration e1, e2 have the same truth
value; hence, the loops must again execute the same number of times.
Now, suppose we can prove that CanSynchronize evaluates to true. In
this case, rule (7) conceptually executes the two loops in lock-step. Specifically,
the premise Σ ` 〈I∧e1∧e2〉S1~S2〈I ′〉, together with |= I ′ → I, ensures that I
is an inductive invariant of the fused loop while(e1∧e2) do S1;S2. Thus, I must
hold when the both loops terminate. Thus, we can safely use the predicate
I ∧ ¬e1 ∧ ¬e2 as a precondition when reasoning about the “continuations” S
and S ′.
Example. In the previous example, we illustrated that it is difficult
to prove non-interference using rule (6) even for a relatively simple example.
Let us now see why rule (7) makes verifying 2-safety easier. Since i and n
are both low according to the taint environment Σ, we can show that the
the CanSynchronize predicate evaluates to true. To prove that the program
obeys non-interference, we use the relational loop invariant I = (i1 = i2∧ τ1 =
τ2 ∧ k1 = k2). It is easy to see that I is a suitable inductive relational loop
invariant, because:
• i1, i2, τ1, τ2 are all set to 0 before the loop starts.
• We know k1 = k2 from the precondition (since they are low inputs)
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• i1 and i2 are increased by the same amount in each iteration of the loop
since k1 = k2.
• τ1 and τ2 are also increased by the same amount in each iteration of the
loop since i1 = i2.
• I implies the post condition |τ1 − τ2| ≤ 0.
Observe that the use of rule (7) allows us to prove the desired property without
reasoning about the total resource consumption of the loop. Hence, we do not
need complicated non-linear loop invariants, and the verification task becomes
much easier to automate.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Assuming soundness of taint environment Σ, if
Σ ` SideChannelFree(λ~p.S, ), then the program λ~p.S does not have an
-bounded resource side-channel.
3.4.3 Loop Invariant Generation
In the previous subsection, we assumed the existence of an oracle for
finding suitable relational loop invariants (recall rule 7). Here, by “relational
loop invariant”, we mean a simulation relation over variables in programs
S1, S2. Specifically, we use such relational loop invariants in two ways: First,
we use them to check whether two loops execute the same number of times.
Second, we use the relational loop invariant to compute the precondition for
the continuations of the two programs. Hence, to apply rule 7, we need an
algorithm for computing such relational loop invariants.
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Algorithm 2 Relational Invariant Generation
Input: Σ, the taint environment.
Input: Φ, the pre-condition of the loop.
Input: e, S, loop condition and loop body.
Input: V , the set of all variables appeared in the loop.
Output: An inductive relational loop invariant
1: function RelationalInvGen(Σ,Φ, e, S, V )
2: (e1, S1) ← α(e, S)
3: (e2, S2) ← α(e, S)
4: Guesses ← {v1 = v2 | v ∈ V }
5: for g ∈ Guesses do
6: if 6|= Φ→ g then
7: Guesses ← Guesses\{g}
8: inductive ← false
9: while ¬ inductive do
10: I ← ∧g∈Guesses g
11: assume Σ ` 〈I ∧ e1 ∧ e2〉S1 ~ S2〈I ′〉
12: inductive ← true
13: for g ∈ Guesses do
14: if 6|= I ′ → g then
15: Guesses ← Guesses\{g}
16: inductive ← false
17: return
∧
g∈Guesses g
Algorithm 2 shows our inference engine for computing relational loop
invariants. This algorithm can be viewed as an instance of monomial predicate
abstraction (i.e., guess-and-check) [103, 63, 156]. Specifically, we consider the
universe Guesses of predicates v1 = v2 relating variables from the two loops.
Because synchronizable loops execute the same number of times, they typically
contain one or more “anchor” variables that are pairwise equal. Thus, we can
often find useful relational invariants over this universe of predicates.
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Figure 3.7: Workflow of the Themis tool
Considering Algorithm 2 in more detail, we first filter our those predi-
cates that are not implied by the precondition Φ (lines 5-7). In lines 9-16, we
then further filter out those predicates that are not preserved in the loop body.
In particular, on line 10, we construct the candidate invariant by conjoining
all remaining predicates in our guess set, and, on line 11, we compute the post
condition I ′ of the loop using the proof rules shown in figure 3.5. Since we
have Σ ` 〈I ∧ e1 ∧ e2〉S1 ~ S2〈I ′〉 and 6|= I ′ → g, this means predicate g is not
preserved by the loop body and is therefore removed from our set of predicates.
When the loop in lines 9-16 terminates, we have Σ ` 〈I ∧ e1 ∧ e2〉S1 ~ S2〈I ′〉
and |= I ′ → I; thus, I is an inductive relational loop invariant.
3.5 Implementation
Figure 3.7 gives a high-level schematic overview of Themis’s architec-
ture. In addition to the QCHL verifier discussed in detail in Section 3.4.1,
Themis also incorporates pointer and taint analyses and instruments the pro-
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gram to explicitly track resource usage. We now give a brief overview of each
of these components.
Pointer analysis. Given the bytecode of a Java application, Themis per-
forms (field- and object-sensitive) pointer analysis to build a precise call graph
and identify all variables that may alias each other. The resulting call graph
and alias information are used by the subsequent taint analysis as well as the
QCHL verifier.
Taint analysis. The use of taint analysis in Themis serves two goals: First,
the QCHL verifier uses the results of the taint analysis to determine whether
two loops can be synchronized. Second, we use taint analysis to identify
hotspots that need to be analyzed more precisely using the QCHL verifier.
The taint analyzer uses the annotations in Themis’s configuration file
to determine taint sources (i.e., high inputs) and propagates taint using a
field- and object-sensitive analysis. Our taint analyzer tracks both explicit
and implicit flows. That is, a variable v is considered tainted if (a) there is
an assignment v := e such that e is tainted (explicit flow), or (b) a write to v
occurs inside a branch whose predicate is tainted (implicit flow).
We use the results of the taint analysis to identify methods that should
be analyzed by the QCHL verifier. A method m is referred to as hot spot if it
reads from a tainted variable. We say that a hot spot m dominates another
hot spot m′ if m′ is a transitive callee of m but not the other way around.
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Any hot spot that does not have dominators is given as an entry point to the
QCHL verifier. In principle, this strategy of running the QCHL verifier on
only hot spots can cause our analysis to report false positives. For instance,
consider the following example:
main(...) { foo(); bar(); }
foo() {
int x = readSecret();
if(x > 0) consume(1); else consume(100);
}
bar() {
int y = readSecret();
if(y <= 0) consume(1); else consume(100);
}
While this program does not have any secret-dependent imbalance in
resource usage, foo and bar individually do not obey non-interference, caus-
ing our analysis to report false positives. However, in practice, we have not
observed any such false positives, and this strategy greatly increases the scal-
ability of the tool.
Resource usage instrumentation The language we considered for our
formalization in Section 3.4.1 is equipped with a consume(x) statement that
models consumption of x units of resource. Unfortunately, since Java programs
do not come with such statements, our implementation uses a cost model to
instrument the program with such consume statements. In principle, our
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framework can detect different classes of side channels, provided that the tool
is given a suitable cost model for the corresponding resource type.
Our current implementation provides cost models for two kinds of re-
source usage, namely, timing and response size. For timing, we use a coarse
cost model where every byte code instruction is assumed to have unit cost.
For response size, each string s that is appended to the response consumes
s.length() units of resource.
Counterexample generation If Themis fails to verify the bounded non-
interference property for a given , it can also generate counterexamples by
using the models provided by the underlying SMT solver. In particular, when
the verification condition (VC) generated by Themis is invalid, the tool asks
the SMT solver for a falsifying assignment and pretty-prints the model re-
turned from Z3 by replacing Z3 symbols with their corresponding variable
names. Since the VCs depend on automatically inferred loop invariants, the
counterexamples generated by Themis may be spurious if the inference engine
does not infer sufficiently strong loop invariants.
The Themis system is implemented in a combination of Java and
OCaml and leverages multiple existing tools, such as Soot [179], Z3 [50], and
Apron [90]. Specifically, our pointer analysis builds on top of Soot [179], and
we extend the taint analysis provided by FlowDroid [9], which is a state-of-
the-art context-, field-, flow-, and object-sensitive taint analyzer, to also track
implicit flows. Our QCHL verifier is implemented in OCaml and uses the Z3
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SMT solver [50] to discharge the generated verification conditions. To prove
the Hoare triples that arise as premises in the QCHL proof rules, we perform
standard weakest precondition computation, leveraging the Apron numerical
abstract domain library [90] to infer standard loop invariants. Recall that
we infer relational loop invariants using the monomial predicate abstraction
technique described in Section 3.4.3.
Our formal description of QCHL in chapter 3.4.1 uses a simplified pro-
gramming language that does not have many of the complexities of Java.
Themis handles these complexities by first leveraging the Soot framework
to parse the Java bytecode to Soot IR, and then using an in-house “front-
end” that further lowers Soot IR into a form closer to what is presented in
chapter 3.4.1. In particular, the transformation from Soot to our IR recovers
program structures (loops, conditionals etc.) and encodes heap accesses in
terms of arrays. The verifier performs strongest postcondition calculation over
our internal IR and encodes verification conditions with SMT formulae.
In the remainder of this section, we explain how we handle various
challenges that we encountered while building the Themis frontend.
Object encoding Since objects are pervasive in Java applications, their en-
coding has a significant impact on the precision and scalability of the approach.
In Themis, we adopt a heap encoding that is similar to ESC-Java [65]. Specif-
ically, instance fields of objects are represented as maps from object references
(modeled as integer variables) to the value of the corresponding field. Reads
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and writes to the map are modeled using select and update functions defined
by the theory of arrays in SMT solvers. If two object references are known not
to be the same (according to the results of the pointer analysis), we then add
a disequality constraint between the corresponding variables.
Method invocation Since the simplified language from Section 3.4.1 did
not allow function calls, we only described an intraprocedural version of the
QCHL verifier. We currently perform interprocedural analysis by function
inlining, which is performed as a preprocessing step at the internal IR level
before the analysis takes place. Since the QCHL verifier only needs to ana-
lyze hot spots (which typically constitute a small fraction of the program),
we do not find inlining to be a major scalability bottleneck. However, since
recursive procedures cannot be handled using function inlining, our current
implementation requires models for recursive procedures that correspond to
hot spots.
Virtual calls and instanceof encoding The result of certain operations in
the Java language, such as virtual calls and the instanceof operator, depends
on the runtime values of their operands. To faithfully model those operations ,
we encode the type of each allocation site as one of its field, and we transform
virtual calls and instanceof to a series of if statements that branch on this
field. For example, if variable a may point to either allocation A1 of type T1
or allocation A2 of type T2, then the polymorphic call site a.foo() will be
modeled as:
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i f ( a . type == T1)
( (T1) a ) . foo ( ) ;
e l s e i f ( a . type == T2)
( (T2) a ) . foo ( ) ;
We handle the instanceof operator in a similar way.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we describe our evaluation of Themis on a set of
security-critical Java applications. Our evaluation is designed to answer the
following research questions:
Q1. How does Themis compare with state-of-the-art tools for side channel
detection in terms of accuracy and scalability?
Q2. Is Themis able to detect known vulnerabilities in real-world Java appli-
cations, and can Themis verify their repaired versions?
Q3. Is Themis useful for detecting zero-day vulnerabilities from the real
world?
In what follows, we describe a series of experiments that are designed
to answer the above questions. All experiments are conducted on an Intel
Xeon(R) computer with an E5-1620 v3 CPU and 64G of memory running on
Ubuntu 16.04.
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Benchmark Version Size
Time (s)
Blazer Themis
MicroBench
array Safe 16 1.60 0.28
array Unsafe 14 0.16 0.23
loopAndbranch Safe 15 0.23 0.33
loopAndbranch Unsafe 15 0.65 0.16
nosecret Safe 7 0.35 0.20
notaint Unsafe 9 0.28 0.12
sanity Safe 10 0.63 0.41
sanity Unsafe 9 0.30 0.17
straightline Safe 7 0.21 0.49
straightline Unsafe 7 22.20 5.30
STAC
modPow1 Safe 18 1.47 0.61
modPow1 Unsafe 58 218.54 14.16
modPow2 Safe 20 1.62 0.75
modPow2 Unsafe 106 7813.68 141.36
passwordEq Safe 16 2.70 1.10
passwordEq Unsafe 15 1.30 0.39
Literature
k96 Safe 17 0.70 0.61
k96 Unsafe 15 1.29 0.54
gpt14 Safe 15 1.43 0.46
gpt14 Unsafe 26 219.30 1.25
login Safe 16 1.77 0.54
login Unsafe 11 1.79 0.70
Figure 3.8: Comparison between Themis and Blazer.
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3.6.1 Comparison Against Blazer
To evaluate how competitive Themis is with existing tools, we compare
Themis against Blazer [8], a state-of-the-art tool for detecting timing side
channels in Java bytecode. Blazer is a static analyzer that uses a novel
decomposition technique for proving non-interference properties. Since the
Blazer tool is not publicly available, we compare Themis against Blazer
on the same 22 benchmarks that are used to evaluate Blazer in their PLDI’17
paper [8]. These benchmarks include a combination of challenge problems from
the DARPA STAC program, classic examples from previous literature[71, 97,
131], and some microbenchmarks constructed by the developers of Blazer.
Since Blazer verifies standard non-interference (rather than our proposed
-bounded variant), we set the value of  to be 0 when running Themis.
We summarize the results of our comparison against Blazer in Ta-
ble 3.8. 2 One of the key points here is that Themis is able to automatically
verify all 25 programs from the Blazer data set. Moreover, we see that
Themis is consistently faster than Blazer except for a few benchmarks that
take a very short time to analyze. On average, Themis takes a median of 7.73
seconds to verify a benchmark, whereas the median running time of Blazer
is 376.92 seconds.
2 The Blazer paper reports two sets of numbers for running time, namely time for
safety verification alone, and time including attack specification search. Since Themis does
not perform the latter, we only compare time for safety verification. For the “Size” column
in the table, we use the original metric from Blazer, which indicates the number of basic
blocks.
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Benchmark Version LOC LOC’  = 64  = 0 Time (s)
Spring-Security Safe 1630 41 3 3 1.70
Spring-Security Unsafe 1602 32 3 3 1.09
JDK7-MsgDigest Safe 633 30 3 3 1.27
JDK6-MsgDigest Unsafe 619 27 3 3 1.33
Picketbox Safe 208 73 3 7 1.79
Picketbox Unsafe 180 65 3 3 1.55
Tomcat Safe 12221 100 3 7 9.93
Tomcat Unsafe 12173 96 3 3 8.64
Jetty Safe 2667 77 3 3 2.50
Jetty Unsafe 2619 76 3 3 2.07
orientdb Safe 19564 134 3 7 37.99
orientdb Unsafe 19413 131 3 3 38.09
pac4j Safe 1978 104 3 7 3.97
pac4j Unsafe 1900 105 3 3 1.85
boot-auth Safe 7106 74 3 7 9.12
boot-auth Unsafe 6977 69 3 3 8.31
tourPlanner Safe 7735 46 3 3 22.22
tourPlanner Unsafe 7660 34 3 3 22.01
Dyna table Unsafe 175 40 3 3 1.165
Advanced table Unsafe 232 55 3 3 2.01
Figure 3.9: Evaluation on existing vulnerabilities
A checkmark (3) indicates that Themis gives the correct result, while 7 indicates
a false positive.
In summary, while both Blazer and Themis are sound, this compar-
ison shows that Themis can verify more programs than Blazer in a fraction
of the time.
3.6.2 Detection of Known Vulnerabilities
To demonstrate that Themis can be used to detect non-trivial vulner-
abilities in real-world Java programs, we further evaluate Themis on security-
sensitive Java frameworks. The benchmarks we collect come from the following
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sources:
1. Response-size side-channel benchmarks from existing
publication [194]3.
2. One benchmark that contains a response-size side channel from the
DARPA STAC project.
3. A well-known timing side channel in the MessageDigest class from JDK6.
4. Seven other benchmarks with known vulnerabilities collected from Github.
Benchmarks that fall in the first two categories contain response-size side-
channel vulnerabilities, and all other benchmarks contain timing side-channels.
All benchmarks except for those in category (1) also come with a repaired
version that does not exhibit the original vulnerability.
Before running Themis, we need to specify the entry points of each
application. Since most applications come with test cases, we use these test
harnesses as entry points. For those applications for which we do not have
suitable drivers, we manually construct a harness and specify it as the entry
point.
Main results. The table in Figure 3.9 shows the accuracy and running
time of Themis on these benchmarks. Using a value of  = 64, Themis
3We are only able to obtain the source codes for 2 of 3 benchmarks mentioned in the
paper.
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successfully finds vulnerabilities in the original vulnerable versions of these
frameworks and is able to verify that the original vulnerability is no longer
present in the repaired versions. The running time of Themis is also quite
reasonable, taking an average 8.81 seconds to analyze each benchmark.
Benefit of taint analysis. Recall from Sections 3.1 and 3.5 that
Themis performs taint analysis to identify hot spots, which overapproximate
program fragments that may contain a side-channel vulnerability. The QCHL
verifier only analyzes such hot spots rather than the entire program. To demon-
strate the usefulness of taint analysis, we compare the lines of code (in Soot
IR) in the original application (reported in the LOC column) with the lines of
code (also in Soot IR) with those analyzed by the QCHL verifier (reported in
the LOC’ column). As we can see from Figure 3.9, taint analysis significantly
prunes security-irrelevant parts of the application in terms of lines of codes.
This pruning effect can also be observed using other statistics. For example,
the number of reachable methods ranges from 15 to 1487, with an average of
479, before taint analysius, whereas the number of reachable methods after
taint analysis ranges from 6 to 35, with an average of 15, after taint analysis.
Thus, pruning using taint information makes the job of the QCHL verifier
significantly easier.
Benefit of . To justify the need for our relaxed notion of non-
interference, Figure 3.9 also shows the results of the same experiment using
an  value of 0. Hence, the  = 0 column from Figure 3.9 corresponds to the
standard notion of non-interference. As we can see from the table, Themis
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reports several false positives using an  value of 0. In particular, the repaired
versions of some programs still exhibit a minor resource usage imbalance but
this difference is practically infeasible to exploit, so the developers consider
these versions to be side-channel-free. However, these programs are deemed
unsafe using standard non-interference. We believe this comparison shows
that our relaxed policy of -bounded non-interference is useful in practice and
allows security analysts to understand the severity of the side channel.
Benefit of relational analysis. To investigate the benefit of re-
lational invariants, we analyze the safe versions of the 20 benchmarks from
Figures 8 and 9 with relational invariant generation disabled. In this case,
Themis can only verify the safety of 10 of the benchmarks.
Although this number can potentially be increased by using a more
sophisticated non-relational loop invariant generation algorithm, Themis cir-
cumvents this need, instead using simple relational in- variants that are con-
junctions of simple equality constraints. This experiment corroborates the
hypothesis that QCHL makes verification easier by requiring simpler loop in-
variants compared to other techniques like self-composition.
3.6.3 Discovery of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
To evaluate whether Themis can discover unknown vulnerabilities in
real world Java applications, we conduct an experiment on seven popular Java
frameworks. Our data set covers a wide range of Java applications from dif-
ferent domains such as HTTP servers, health care platforms, authentication
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Benchmark LOC Category #Reports Time (s)
Jetty 2619 Server 4 10.17
Tomcat 12173 Server 1 5.86
OpenMRS 10721 Healthcare 1 9.71
OACC 78 Authentication 1 1.83
Apache Shiro 4043 Authentication 0 6.54
Apache Crypto 4505 Crypto 0 4.33
bc-java 5759 Crypto 0 6.89
Figure 3.10: Evaluation Themis on identifying zero-day vulnerabilities from
popular Java applications
frameworks, etc. For example, Eclipse Jetty is a well-known web server that is
embedded in products such as Apache Spark, Google App Engine, and Twit-
ter’s Streaming API. OpenMRS is the world’s leading open source enterprise
electronic medical record system platform; OACC is a well-known Java ap-
plication security framework, and bc-java is an implementation of the Bounty
Castle crypto API in Java.
As in our previous experiment, we first manually annotate each ap-
plication to indicate the sources of confidential information. We then use
Themis to find timing side channels in these applications using an  value of
10. The results of this experiment are summarized in Figure 3.10. As we can
see from this figure, Themis reports a total of seven vulnerabilities in four of
the analyzed applications. We manually inspected each report and confirmed
that the detected vulnerabilities are indeed true positives. We also reported
the vulnerabilities detected by Themis to the developers, and the majority of
these vulnerabilities were confirmed and fixed by the developers in less than
24 hours. However, the vulnerability that we reported for OpenMRS was re-
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jected by the developers. The reason for this false positive is that the leaked
password is actually hashed and salted in the database, but, because the logic
for hashing and salting is not part of the Java implementation, Themis was
not able to reason about this aspect.
To give the reader some intuition about the kinds of side channels de-
tected by Themis, Figure 3.11 shows a security vulnerability from the Eclipse
Jetty web server. The check procedure from Figure 3.11 checks whether the
password provided by the user matches the expected password ( cooked).
The original code performs this check by calling the built-in equality method
provided by the java.lang.String library. Since the built-in equality method
returns false as soon as it finds a mismatch between two characters, line 10 in
the check method introduces a timing side-channel vulnerability.
The developers have fixed the vulnerability [1] in this code snippet by
replacing line 10 with the (commented out) code shown in line 9. In particular,
the fix involves calling the safe version of equals, called stringEquals, which
checks for equality between all characters in the strings. This repaired version
of the check method no longer contains a vulnerability for any  > 1, and
Themis can verify that the check procedure is now safe.
3.7 Limitations
Like any other program analysis tool, Themis has a number of limi-
tations. First, due to the fundamental undecidability of the underlying static
analysis problem, Themis is incomplete and may report false positives (e.g.,
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1 public boolean check(Object credentials)
2 {
3 if (credentials instanceof char[])
4 credentials = new String((char[])credentials);
5 if (!(credentials instanceof String) &&
6 !(credentials instanceof Password))
7 LOG.warn("Can’t check " +
8 credentials.getClass() + " against CRYPT");
9
10 String passwd = credentials.toString();
11 // FIX: return stringEquals(_cooked, UnixCrypt.crypt(passwd,_cooked));
12 return _cooked.equals(
13 UnixCrypt.crypt(passwd,_cooked));
14 }
15
16 /**
17 * <p>Utility method that replaces String.equals()
18 * to avoid timing attacks.</p>
19 */
20 static boolean stringEquals(String s1, String s2)
21 {
22 boolean result = true;
23 int l1 = s1.length();
24 int l2 = s2.length();
25 if(l1 != l2) result = false;
26 int n = (l1 < l2) ? l1 : l2;
27 for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
28 result &= s1.charAt(i) == s2.charAt(i);
29 return result;
30 }
Figure 3.11: Eclipse Jetty code snippet that contains a timing side channel
Line 12 is the original buggy code. This vulnerability can be fixed by implementing
stringEquals (lines 20 – 30) and calling it instead of the built-in String.equals
method.
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due to imprecision in pointer analysis or loop invariant generation). For ex-
ample, our method for inferring relational invariants is based on monomial
predicate abstraction using a fixed set of pre-defined templates, and we restrict
our templates to equalities between variables. In addition, our non-relational
invariant generator is based on traditional abstract interpretation, which does
not distinguish array elements precisely.
Second, dynamic features of the Java language, such as reflective calls,
dynamic class loading, and exceptional handling, pose challenges for Themis.
Our current implementation can handle some cases of reflection (e.g., reflective
calls with string constants), but reflection can, in general, cause Themis to
have false negatives.
Finally, Themis unconditionally trusts all human inputs into the sys-
tem, which may result in false negatives if the user inputs are not accurate.
Said user inputs include application entry points, taint sources, cost instru-
mentations, and models of library methods.
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Chapter 4
Enhanced Relational Verification Using
Reinforcement Learning
In the previous chapter, we introduce the techinque of verifying non-
interference, a 2-safety property. In this chapter, we generalize this approach
to proving a more general class of relational properties. Recall from section 1.1
that relational properties state the relationships between multiple programs
or multiple runs of the same program. As we saw in Chapter 3, a standard
way to prove such properties is to reduce the original problem into discharging
a set of standard Hoare triples. Despite the power and conceptual simplicity
of this approach, a key challenge is that there are typically many ways to
reduce a relational verification problem to proving standard safety. While
each reduction method corresponds to a valid, provably-sound proof strategy,
some of these strategies are much more amenable to automation than others.
For example, consider the problem of verifying noninterference of pro-
gram P1 and P2 shown in Figure 4.1 under the assumption that all input
arguments are marked as low inputs. Although it is relatively straightforward
for a human to recongnize that the easiest way to prove the noninterference
property is to swap the order of the two loops in P2 and synchronize each of
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void P1(int n1, int k1) {
for (int i = 0; i < n1; ++i)
consume(k1);
for (int i = 0; i < n1; ++i) {
consume(k1);
consume(k1);
}
}
void P2(int n2, int k2) {
for (int i = 0; i < n2; ++i) {
consume(k2);
consume(k2);
}
for (int i = 0; i < n2; ++i)
consume(k2);
}
Figure 4.1: Example programs
them with the corresponding loops in P1, the verification strategy described
in Chapter 3.4.1 is not intelligent enough to spot the pattern. Instead, it will
na¨ıvely try to synchronize the first loop in P1 with the first loop in P2, rec-
ognizing that synchronization is not feasible due to the difference of resource
consumption in the loop body, and fall back to self-composition where a much
harder loop invariant is required from the underlying invariant generation al-
gorithm.
The problem of finding a good reduction strategy that is most amenable
to automation is not unique to the property of noninterference. The challenge
is shared among all relational verification problems in general. Due to the sig-
nificance of relational verification across many application domains, and due to
the fact that most commonly used approach for relational verification would
inevitably have to handle the problem of reduction strategy selection, this
problem will be the central focus for this chapter. Specifically, we propose an
algorithm to automatically and efficiently synthesize the best reduction strat-
egy using a combination of reinforcement learning and backtracking search.
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4.1 Verifying Relational Properties
Existing techniques reduce relational verification to safety checking ei-
ther by explicitly constructing a product program [13, 16, 58] or introducing a
proof system where certain proof obligations can be discharged by an off-the-
shelf safety checker [23, 18, 170]. In this chapter, we adopt the latter approach
and think of relational verification as the problem of searching for a proof
within a relational program logic.
Following the formulation in section 3.4, we assume a relational pro-
gram logic that derives judgments of the form
` 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉
where S1 and S2 are programs containing disjoint sets of variables and Φ
(resp. Ψ) is a relational precondition (resp. post-condition). In the rest of
this chapter, we refer to triples of the form 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉 as relational Hoare
triples.
By studying prior work on relational program verification [23, 170, 13,
16, 59], we built a library of 37 different proof rules and tactics, of which five
representative ones are shown in Figure 4.2. While a detailed discussion of
these proof rules is out of scope for this chapter, we highlight some of their
salient features below.
Reduction to safety. As illustrated by the Lift and Seq rules from Fig-
ure 4.2, the premises of a relational proof rule can involve proving standard
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` {Φ}S{Ψ}
(Lift)` 〈Φ〉skip~ S〈Ψ〉
` {Φ}S{Φ′} ` 〈Φ′〉S1 ~ S2〈Ψ〉
(Seq)` 〈Φ〉S;S1 ~ S2〈Ψ〉
Φ⇒ (e1 ↔ e2) Φ⇒ I
` 〈I ∧ e1 ∧ e2〉S1 ~ S2〈I〉
` 〈I ∧ ¬e1 ∧ ¬e2〉S ~ S′〈Ψ〉
(Sync)` 〈Φ〉while e1 do S1;S ~while e2 do S2;S′〈Ψ〉
` 〈Φ ∧ e〉S;while e do S;S1 ~ S2〈I〉
` 〈Φ ∧ ¬e〉S1 ~ S2〈Ψ〉
(Peel)` 〈Φ〉while e do S;S1 ~ S2〈Ψ〉
f1 = λ~p1. S
′
1 f2 = λ~p2. S
′
2 ` 〈P〉S′1 ~ S′2〈Q〉
Φ⇒ P[ ~a1/~p1, ~a2/~p2]
` 〈Q[ ~a1/~p1, ~a2/~p2]〉S1 ~ S2〈Ψ〉
(Call)` 〈Φ〉call f1( ~a1);S1 ~ call f2( ~a2);S2〈Ψ〉
Figure 4.2: Selected rules for reducing 2-safety verification problem to standard
Hoare triples
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Hoare triples of the form {P}S{Q}. Thus, relational program logics eventually
reduce the problem to standard safety checking.
Non-determinism. Given a proof goal G = 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉, there are typ-
ically many rules that can be used to prove G. For example, if S1 and S2 are
both while loops, we can apply three different rules (namely, Seq, Sync, and
Peel) even for the small subset of proof rules shown in Figure 4.2.
Sensitivity to proof strategy. Let us define a proof strategy to be a map-
ping from each proof subgoal to a proof rule that can be used for discharging
it. Because the base cases of a relational proof require invoking an off-the-shelf
safety checker, the success of a particular proof strategy depends on how easy
or difficult the corresponding safety checking problems are. Thus, some proof
strategies may lead to successful proofs, while others may not.
Large search space. Since there are many proof rules that can be used to
discharge a relational Hoare triple, the search space of proof strategies is very
large. For example, suppose we have m rules with k subgoals. Then, given
two programs S1, S2 of size n, there are up to O((mk)
n) possible applications
of the proof rules.
Shape of the rules. As we can see from Figure 4.2, each relational proof
rule R consists of (i) a goal G (i.e., a relational Hoare triple), (ii) a set of
subgoals Ω = {G1, . . . ,Gn}, where each Gi is also a relational Hoare triple, and
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(iii) a set of verification conditions (VCs) (e.g., Φ → (e1 ↔ e2) and Φ → I in
rule Sync). Thus, we can represent each relational proof rule R as a quadruple
R = (Rid,RG,RΩ,Rϕ), where Rid is the name of the rule, RG,RΩ represent the
goal and subgoals respectively, and Rϕ is a formula that corresponds to the
conjunction of all VCs. Observe that the VCs can involve unknown predicates
such as I in rule Sync or pre- and post-conditions P,Q in rule Call; thus we
represent VCs as a system of Constrained Horn Clauses (CHCs) [49, 120].
Furthermore, since standard Hoare triples can also be encoded as CHCs [28,
48], we also think of the standard Hoare triples that occur in the premises as
part of the VC of the corresponding rule.
Due to non-determinism and sensitivity to proof strategy, it is critical
to have a good proof strategy that reduces the original relational problem into
a standard safety problem that is easy to discharge. However, constructing this
proof strategy can be tricky, especially when the behavior of the underlying
safety checker is opaque. Moreover, the na¨ıve strategy of trying all possible
reduction strategies is also not feasible in practice because of the large search
space. As a result, prior techniques either use domain-specific heuristics (e.g.,
[189, 170, 37, 171]) or require the user to manually specify a suitable reduction
strategy (e.g., [13, 59]). Both of these approaches are sub-optimal in that the
latter one lacks automation whereas the first one, by exploring a limited subset
of possible reduction strategies, may fail to prove the property.
We aims to address this challenge by guiding relational proof search
using machine learning. That is, our goal is the derivation of a probability
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distribution over possible relational verification strategies such that those that
are deemed more likely-to-be-successful by the machine learning model are
explored first.
4.2 Representing Proof Strategies
Our goal in the rest of this chapter is to automate relational verification
by efficiently searching through a large space of possible proof strategies. In
this section, we will describe how we represent proof strategies and formalize
what we mean by a strategy being successful. Our learning algorithm and
search algorithm will be explained in the following chapters.
Intuitively, a proof strategy specifies which rule to apply to discharge
each proof subgoal. In the rest of this chapter, we represent proof strategies
as trees where nodes correspond to proof subgoals and edges represent the
application of some proof rule.
Definition 8 (Proof strategy). A proof strategy is a tuple Υ = (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG)
where
- V is a set of nodes.
- E is a set of arcs.
- AR maps each node to either a proof rule R or ⊥.
- Aϕ maps each node to a verification condition.
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v1
(R1, ϕ1,G1)
v2
(R2, ϕ2,G2)
v4
(R4, ϕ4,G4)
v3
(⊥, true,G3)
(a) Before applying R3
v1
(R1, ϕ1,G1)
v2
(R2, ϕ2,G2)
v4
(R4, ϕ4,G4)
v3
(R3, ϕ3,G3)
v5
(⊥, true,G5)
(b) After applying R3
Figure 4.3: Example proof strategies
- AG maps each node to the corresponding proof goal 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉 for
its subtree.
We refer to AR, Aϕ, andAG as the rule, VC, and goal annotations re-
spectively, and we use the symbol ⊥ to indicate open branches of the proof.
That is, if AR(v) is ⊥, this means that we have not yet chosen a proof rule
for proving the subgoal associated with v. Thus, we also differentiate between
complete and incomplete proof strategies:
Definition 9 (Complete proof strategy). We say that v ∈ V is an open
branch of proof strategy S if AR(v) = ⊥. A proof strategy is complete if it
does not have any open branches and incomplete otherwise.
Example 4.2.1. Figure 4.3a shows an example proof strategy Υ. Based on
the tree structure, we see that nodes v2 and v3 correspond to subgoals of v1,
which represents the proof goal G1. Furthermore, since v1 is annotated with
rule R1, we can tell that proof subgoals v2 and v3 were obtained by applying
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proof rule R1. Also, node v1 is annotated with verification condition ϕ1; this
means ϕ1 must be discharged for the application of rule R1 to be valid. Finally,
note that v3 is an open branch of the proof since we have AR(v3) = ⊥. Thus,
Υ is incomplete.
Since our verification algorithm starts with a completely unconstrained
strategy and iteratively refines it, we define the notion of initial strategy for a
given proof goal G:
Definition 10 (Initial strategy). Given a proof goal G, the initial strategy
for G, denoted Υ0(G), is given by:
({v1}, ∅, {v1 7→ ⊥}, {v1 7→ true}, {v1 7→ G})
Thus, Υ0(G) encodes all possible ways of proving the goal G within the
given proof system. Since our verification algorithm will iteratively refine its
strategy by expanding an open branch, Algorithm 3 desribes how we apply
a proof rule R to strategy Υ. Given a proof rule R and incomplete strategy
Υ, ApplyProofRule yields a refined strategy by generating (a) verification
conditions as prescribed by Rϕ, and (b) new proof subgoals G1, . . . ,Gn accord-
ing to RG. Note that each proof subgoal leads to the addition of an open
branch in the refined strategy. 1
1In Algorithm 3, GenVC and GenSubgoals take a proof rule and a proof goal as input and
generate new VCs and new subgoals according to the proof rules in Figure 4.2, respectively.
The FirstOpenBranch function returns the first open branch of the given strategy. Since
every open branch must be closed eventually, we assume a canonical order for simplicity.
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Algorithm 3 Rule application
Input: Υ = (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG): incomplete proof strategy
Input: R = (Rid,RG,RΩ,Rϕ): rule to apply
Output: A refined proof strategy
1: procedure ApplyProofRule(Υ, R)
2: v ← FirstOpenBranch(Υ)
3: AR(v) ← Rid
4: Aϕ(v) ← GenVC(Rϕ, AG(v))
5: Ω ← GenSubgoals(RΩ, AG(v))
6: for Gi ∈ Ω do
7: v′ ← fresh node
8: (V, E) ← (V ∪ { v′ }, E ∪ { v → v′ })
9: (AR, Aϕ) ← (AR[v′ ← ⊥], Aϕ[v′ ← true])
10: AG ← AG[v′ ← Gi]
11: return (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG)
Example 4.2.2. Figure 4.3b shows the result of applying rule R3 to the open
branch of Figure 4.3a. Here, R3 generates one new subgoal G5 with associated
verification conditions ϕ3. The rule application introduces a new open branch
v5 below v3, with Aϕ(v5) initialized to true.
Definition 11 (Strategy refinement). We say that a strategy Υ′ directly
refines another strategy Υ, written Υ′ 1 Υ, if Υ′ is the result of calling
ApplyProofRule on Υ for some proof rule R. We define  as the reflexive
transitive closure of 1 and say that Υ′ refines Υ whenever Υ′  Υ.
Given a proof strategy, we need a way of determining whether it results
in a valid proof. Towards this goal, we define a successful proof strategy as
follows:
Definition 12 (Successful proof strategy). A proof strategy Υ = (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG)
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is successful if
- Υ is complete.
- The formula
∧
v∈V Aϕ(v) can be proven satisfiable.
Recall from Section 4.1 that we represent verification conditions as
Constrained Horn Clauses (CHCs). Thus, the satisfiability of the formula∧
v∈V Aϕ(v) means that there exists an interpretation of the unknown relations
under which the formula evaluates to true.
Definition 13 (Failing proof strategy). A proof strategy Υ = (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG)
is failing if the conjunction
∧
v∈V Aϕ(v) is unsatisfiable.
Note that, unlike successful proof strategies, failing strategies need not
be complete. In particular, the formula can become unsatisfiable
∧
v∈V Aϕ(v)
even when the proof contains open branches. Our proof search algorithm will
take advantage of this observation in Section 4.5.
4.3 Learning Algorithm Overview
In this section, we give a high-level overview of our relational verifica-
tion algorithm and highlight its salient features.
Searching for relational proofs. As mentioned earlier, our verification al-
gorithm performs backtracking search over proof strategies, prioritizing those
that are most promising. To this end, we use reinforcement learning to predict
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which proof strategies are most likely to be successful. Specifically, our rein-
forcement learning algorithm produces a distribution p over complete proof
strategies such that, if p(Υ1) > p(Υ2), then Υ1 is more likely to be a successful
strategy compared to Υ2 according to the learned model.
Given a specific relational verification task t, we use the notation p(t)
to denote the distribution of complete proof strategies Υ that are applicable
to verifying t (i.e., the root node of Υ is annotated with the initial proof goal
for t). Now, to solve a relational verification problem t, our search algorithm
initializes p0 = p
(t). Then, on each iteration i = 0, 1, 2, ... (up to some upper
bound r)2, it chooses a complete proof strategy Υi that has high probability
according to pi, and checks whether Υi is successful. If so, the verification
algorithm terminates and returns Υi. Otherwise, based on feedback explaining
why Υi was unsuccessful, our algorithm constrains the support of pi to obtain
a new distribution pi+1 that avoids making mistakes similar to those in Υi. In
Section 4.5, we describe how our search strategy constructs pi+1 given pi and
a failing proof strategy Υi.
Learning objective. The goal of our learning algorithm is to generate a
distribution p that places high probability mass on successful proof strategies.
2While the value of r used by the search algorithm is large (it corresponds to the timeout
set on the search algorithm), during training we choose r to be small. By doing so, we
encourage the the search algorithm to discover a successful proof strategy earlier in the
search.
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In particular, it aims to solve the following optimization problem:
p∗ = arg max
p
Pr
t∼T,Υ∼ξ(t)r,p [O(Υ) = 1] (4.1)
where t ∼ T is a uniformly random task, O(Υ) is 1 if Υ is successful and 0
otherwise, and ξ
(t)
r,p is a distribution of proof strategies checked by the search
algorithm, i.e.,
ξ(t)r,p(Υ) =
1
r
r∑
i=1
p
(t)
i (Υ).
Essentially, the objective in Eq. (4.1) is to maximize the probability that our
search algorithm discovers a successful proof strategy for a uniformly random
task within r iterations.
However, there are three challenges to solving the optimization prob-
lem from Eq. (4.1): First, we do not have positive examples of successful
proof strategies. Second, we only have a finite training set of tasks Ttrain.
Finally, standard reinforcement learning algorithms cannot be applied to op-
timize Eq. (4.1) due to the modified distribution ξ
(t)
r,p. Below, we discuss how
we address these challenges.
Reinforcement learning. Since we do not have positive examples of suc-
cessful proof strategies, we cannot use standard supervised learning algorithms
to optimize Eq. (4.1). Instead, we have oracle access to O in the form of
our proof checker, which makes it possible to use reinforcement learning. In
Section 4.4.2, we describe how to formulate the optimization problem from
Eq. (4.1) as a reinforcement learning problem.
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Function approximation. Since we are only given a finite subset of tasks
Ttrain ⊆ T, we can only approximate the samples t ∼ T from Eq. (4.1) with
uniformly random samples t ∼ Ttrain. However, the solution to the approx-
imate objective may not generalize to all of T. Thus, we use a feature map
to improve generalization. The essential idea is to restrict the search space
to distributions p(Υ) that only depend on Υ through a handcrafted feature
map φ(Υ) ∈ X = Rd, which is designed to map similar proof strategies to
similar features. In particular, given two strategies Υ and Υ′, we should
have φ(Υ) ≈ φ(Υ′) if the proof goals labeling their roots are similar, and
φ(Υ) 6≈ φ(Υ′) otherwise. Then, if the optimal distribution p∗ assigns high
probability mass to Υ, it similarly assigns high probability mass to Υ′ (as-
suming p∗ is reasonably smooth). Thus, knowledge can be transferred to new
tasks with proof goals that are different from those for training tasks t ∈ T.
We describe this approach in Section 4.4.3.
Reinforcement learning algorithm. Standard reinforcement learning al-
gorithms can only be applied to optimizing Eq. (4.1) for the case ξ
(t)
r,p = p(t),
i.e., where r = 1. In other words, these algorithms can only optimize for the
case where the search algorithm only considers a single proof strategy, so they
are not directly applicable to our setting where the search algorithm tries mul-
tiple consecutive proof strategies. In Section 4.4.4, we describe how we adapt
the standard policy gradient algorithm to our setting.
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...
...
Figure 4.4: An example of an MDP constructed for a relational verification
problem.
4.4 Reinforcement Learning
4.4.1 Background on Reinforcement Learning
A reinforcement learning problem is typically specified as a Markov
decision process (MDP). Informally, an MDP is a transition system where the
process is in some state Si at each time step, and a decision maker can take
any of the actions A1, . . . , An that is available at state Si and collects some
reward R. The goal of reinforcement learning is to find the optimal action to
take in each state to maximize the expected long-term reward.
Definition 14. A Markov decision process is a tuple M = (S, S0, SF ,A,P,R),
where S is the set of states, S0 is the initial distribution over states, SF is a
set of terminal states, A is the set of actions, P : S × A → S is the (possibly
stochastic) transition function, and R : S → R is the (possibly stochastic)
reward function.3
3Oftentimes, a discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1) is needed to ensure that the learning problem
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Definition 15. A policy pi for an MDP M is a (possibly stochastic) function
pi : S→ A specifying which action to take in each state.
When we use a stochastic policy pi to choose which actions to take, this results
in a random trajectory, referred to as a rollout, through the state space:
Definition 16. A rollout ζ ∼ pi is a random sequence of tuples ζ ∈ (S× (A∪
{∅})× R)∗ constructed as follows:
• sample a random state S0 ∼ S0
• sample actions Ai = pi(Si), random transitions Si+1 = P(Si, Ai), and re-
wards Ri = R(Si) for each i ∈ {1, ..., T} until a terminal state ST ∈ SF is
reached.
Then, rollout ζ is the sequence:
((S0, A0, R0), ..., (ST−1, AT−1, RT−1), (ST ,∅, RT ))
Note that there is no action AT for the last element since ST is a terminal
state.
As mentioned earlier, the objective in reinforcement learning is to maximize
expected long-term reward:
for the MDP is well-defined; however, in our setting, the MDP always terminates after a
finite number of steps.
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Definition 17. Given an MDP M, the reinforcement learning problem is to
find the optimal policy pi∗ = arg maxpi R(pi), where R(pi) denotes the cumulative
reward of pi:
R(pi) = Eζ∼pi
[
T∑
i=0
Ri
]
.
4.4.2 MDP for Relational Verification
To use reinforcement learning in our setting, we need to formulate an
MDP Mproof encoding relational verification problems. Intuitively, given an
(incomplete) proof strategy Υ, we want to learn a policy that chooses a proof
rule R to apply to Υ that maximizes the chance of eventually constructing a
successful (complete) proof strategy. Thus, states in our MDP are proof strate-
gies, and actions are proof rules that can be applied to the current strategy.
More formally, we construct the MDP Mproof = (S, S0, SF ,A,P,R) as follows:
• The states S are proof strategies Υ.
• S0 corresponds to initial proof stategies (recall Def. 10)
• The terminal states SF are complete proof strategies.
• The actions A ∈ A are all pairs (v,R), where R is a proof rule that can be
applied to node v in the current proof strategy Υ.
• The (deterministic) transitions are P(S,A) = S ′, where S ′ is the proof
strategy obtained from S by applying the proof rule A to the first open
branch of S.
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• The reward function is R(S) = O(S) (i.e., the reward is 1 if S is successful
and 0 otherwise).
Intuitively, the actions in Mproof incrementally construct a complete proof
strategy ST ∈ SF from the initial proof strategy S(t)0 , where t ∼ T is a uniformly
random task, and the reward is whether ST is successful.
Example 4.4.1. Figure 4.4 shows an example of an MDP for a relational
verification problem G1. Each state is a proof strategy Υ, and each action is a
pair (v,R) consisting of a node v in the current proof strategy and a proof rule
R that can be applied to v. The initial state is the left-most state. For each
action, an arrow shows the state transition that would occur if that action is
taken. The right-most state on the top is a final state with reward 1 since it
represents a successful proof strategy; all other states have reward 0.
Connection to our objective. Now, we describe the connection between
the optimal policy for Mproof and the optimization problem from Eq. (4.1).
First, we define a correspondence between distributions p over complete proof
strategies and MDP policies pi:
Definition 18. Given a policy pi for Mproof, its terminal state distribution is
ppi(Υ) = Prζ∼pi(ST = Υ),
where ST is the terminal state of ζ.
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In other words, ppi(Υ) is the probability that a rollout ζ ∼ pi ends in terminal
state ST = Υ. Since the terminal states in Mproof are complete proof strate-
gies, ppi is a distribution over complete proof strategies. Then, we have the
following theorem, which relates the problem of maximizing Eq. (4.1) to the
reinforcement learning problem for our MDP Mproof:
Theorem 4. Let pi∗ be the optimal policy for Mproof, and
p∗ = arg max
p
Prt∼T,Υ∼p(t) [O(Υ) = 1], (4.2)
where p is a distribution over complete proof strategies. Then, we have p∗ =
ppi∗.
There is a key difference between our objective Eq. (4.1) and the objective
Eq. (4.2) from Theorem 4: In Eq. (4.1), the probability is taken with respect
to complete proof strategies Υ ∼ ξ(t)r,p (i.e., the distribution of proof strate-
gies tried by our search algorithm given guiding distribution p(t)), whereas
in Eq. (4.2), the probability is taken with respect to Υ ∼ p(t) (i.e., a sin-
gle proof strategy according to p(t)). In other words, our objective optimizes
over a sequence of complete proof strategies tried by the search algorithm,
whereas Eq. (4.2) optimizes for a single randomly sampled proof strategy. In
Section 4.4.4, we describe how to modify an existing reinforcement learning
algorithm to optimize Eq. (4.1) instead of Eq. (4.2).
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4.4.3 Function Approximation
Recall that, when we only have a limited set of training tasks available,
then the solution to Eq. (4.1) may not generalize well beyond tasks in the
training set. As standard, we use approximate reinforcement learning to im-
prove generalization power [174]. We first give background on the approximate
RL and then describe our design choices within this framework
Background on approximate reinforcement learning. In approximate
reinforcement learning, one needs to provide:
• A feature map φ : S→ X, where X = Rd, which maps each state S to a
feature vector φ(S) representing S.
• A function family fθ : X → A, parameterized by θ ∈ Θ = Rm, which
maps feature vectors to actions.
Then, rather than search over all possible policies, the reinforcement learning
algorithm restricts to policies of the form fθ(φ(S)) (for θ ∈ Θ):
Definition 19. Given a feature map φ : S → X and function family fθ,
the approximate reinforcement learning problem is to compute the optimal
parameters
θ∗ = arg max
θ∈Θ
R(θ),
where R(θ) = R(piθ) and piθ(S) = fθ(φ(S)).
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In other words, the goal of approximate reinforcement learning is to
find a policy within function family fθ that maximizes expected cumulative
reward.
In order for approximate reinforcement learning to be effective, the
feature map φ must be constructed using domain expertise to balance two
competing goals: First, given two states S and S ′, if the most promising
actions to take in S and S ′ are similar, then we should have φ(S) ≈ φ(S ′). On
the other hand, if the most promising actions are very different, then we should
have φ(S) 6≈ φ(S ′). Then, if the reinforcement learning algorithm learns the
best actions to take in state S, this knowledge is automatically transferred to
taking good actions in state S ′ (assuming smoothness of fθ).
Approximating our objective. Given a feature map and function family,
we can approximate Eq. (4.1) as follows. First, given parameters θ ∈ Θ, we
have the following corresponding distribution over complete proof strategies:
Definition 20. Given parameters θ ∈ Θ, its terminal state distribution is
pθ = ppiθ .
Then, rather than optimize over all distributions p, we restrict to optimizing
over proof strategies of the form pθ (for θ ∈ Θ):
θ∗ = arg max
θ∈Θ
Pr
t∼T,S∼ξ(t)r,θ
[O(S) = 1], (4.3)
where ξr,θ = ξr,pθ .
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Feature map. In order to apply the approximation framework to our prob-
lem, we need to map each proof strategy to a feature vector. Since proof
strategies are complex tree-structured objects involving many relational Hoare
triples, our feature map grossly over-approximates the states inMproof . Specifi-
cally, we design φ(Υ) to take into account both (a) the global aspects of Υ (e.g.,
depth and breadth of its tree structure, number of open/closed branches, etc.)
as well as (b) local properties of the first open branch of Υ. For (b), suppose
that the active open branch is labeled with the proof goal G = 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2 〈Ψ〉.
We featurize this relational Hoare triple by both considering which proof
rules are (syntactically) applicable for discharging G and also performing a
lightweight “diff” between S1 and S2. In particular, our differencing algorithm
considers features such as whether both S1, S2 start with the same type of
statement, whether they involve loops or recursive functions, the ratio be-
tween their trip count and step size (if both start with loops) etc. Thus,
intuitively two strategies Υ1 and Υ2 will be deemed similar under φ if (a) their
tree structures are similar, and (b) the same proof rule is likely to be successful
for discharging the first open branches of Υ1 and Υ2.
Function family. In addition to the feature map, we also need a func-
tion family fθ for mapping features (i.e., proof strategies) to actions (i.e.,
proof rules). For this, we use a standard choice in the reinforcement learn-
ing literature, namely the function family fθ of neural networks with two
(fully-connected) hidden layers and ReLU activations. Then, θ is the con-
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catenation of all the weight and bias parameters of the layers in the neural
network [151, 119, 186, 19].
4.4.4 Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
Recall from Section 4.4.2 that an optimal policy for our MDP does not
yield an optimal solution to Eq. 4.1. In particular, standard RL maximizes
expected reward under the assumption that we will explore a single rollout
of the learned policy, whereas we want to maximize expected reward when
exploring multiple rollouts during a backtracking search algorithm. Towards
this goal, we describe a modified reinforcement learning algorithm that directly
optimizes for our objective.
Our proposed optimization method builds on the policy gradient algo-
rithm, which optimizes the cumulative reward R(θ) as a function of the policy
parameters θ ∈ Θ using stochastic gradient descent. There are two key reasons
for building on top of the policy gradient algorithm: First, as we discuss in
the rest of this chapter, policy gradient is easy to adapt to directly optimize
Eq. (4.3). Second, because our feature vector φ(Υ) grossly overapproximates
Υ, we run into the so-called perceptual aliasing problem [40, 114], where two
states that are different look the same under φ. In contrast to alternative
algorithms like Q-learning, it is well-known that policy gradient works better
in this scenario.
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Background on policy gradient. The key challenge solved by the pol-
icy gradient algorithm is how to compute an estimate of the gradient d
dθ
R(θ).
This algorithm is based on the the following well-known policy gradient theo-
rem [175]:
Theorem 5. We have
d
dθ
R(θ) = Eζ∼piθ [`(ζ)],
where
`(ζ) =
T−1∑
i=0
(
T∑
j=i+1
Rj
)
d
dθ
log piθ(Si, Ai).
In particular, the policy gradient theorem gives the gradient of the objective
R(θ), making it possible to use gradient descent to optimize R(θ) as a function
of θ.
Our algorithm. We now describe our algorithm for optimizing our objective
in Eq. (4.3), i.e.,
J(θ) = Pr
t∼T,S∼ξ(t)r,θ
[O(S) = 1].
To solve this problem, we leverage additional structure of our search algorithm:
Recall that, given guiding distribution p over complete proof strategies, our
search algorithm initializes p0 = p
(t), and then iteratively constructs a sequence
of distributions p0, p1, p2, ..., pr. As we describe in Section 4.5, this sequence
of distributions corresponds to a sequence of policies piθ,0, piθ,1, piθ,2, ..., piθ,r,
where pi = p
(t)
piθ,i . Then, we have the following theorem:
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Theorem 6. We have
dJ
dθ
(θ) =
1
r
r∑
i=1
Eζ∼piθ,i [`(ζ)],
where `(ζ) is the same as in Theorem 5.
As in standard policy gradient, we can use known techniques [175] to approx-
imate the gradient of J(θ) as follows:
dJ
dθ
(θ) ≈ 1
r
r∑
i=1
1
n
n∑
k=1
ˆ`(ζ(i,k)),
where ζ(i,k) ∼ pii,θ. Thus, we can use this approximate gradient in conjunction
with gradient descent to compute the optimal parameters:
θ∗ = arg max
θ∈Θ
J(θ).
4.5 Policy-Guided Proof Search
In this section, we show how to use the optimal policy pi synthesized
using reinforcement learning to perform backtracking search over proof strate-
gies. Towards this goal, a na¨ıve approach would be to explore rollouts of pi
according to according to their probability of ending in a successful proof strat-
egy. Essentially, such an approach corresponds to never updating the guiding
distribution p(t), i.e., pi+1 = pi.
However, the drawback of this approach is that failures may be correlated—
two proof strategies Υ and Υ′ that are very probable according to pi may be
unsuccessful for similar reasons. Even after discovering that Υ is unsuccessful,
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the na¨ıve approach would not learn from this failure and would likely try Υ′
on a subsequent iteration.
Our search algorithm addresses this issue by integrating logical learning
into the statistical learning approach described in Section 4.4. Specifically, in
addition to using the stochastic policy to guide the search, we also use the
feedback provided by the verifier (i.e., CHC solver) to block proof strategies
that are guaranteed to result in failure. The main idea is to analyze the root
cause of an unsuccessful proof attempt and use this information to prune the
search space. Based on these ideas, we propose a backtracking search algorithm
that (a) uses the policy to decide which proof strategy to refine next, and (b)
leverages feedback from the verifier to avoid the exploration of proof strategies
that share the same root cause of failure as a previously explored one.
Our relational verification algorithm, called RelVerif, is shown in Al-
gorithm 4. Given a relational Hoare triple G and the stochastic policy pi learned
from the training examples, RelVerif returns a successful proof strategy if
one exists and ⊥ otherwise. At a high level, the algorithm works as follows: It
maintains a worklist W of (incomplete) proof strategies, which initially con-
tains the unconstrained strategy Υ0(G) (recall Def. 10). During each iteration,
the algorithm invokes a procedure called ChooseStrategy, discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5.1, to pick the most promising strategy according to policy pi (line 5)
and constructs a series of refinements Υ1, . . . ,Υn by applying each one of the
applicable proof rules Ri in the relational proof system ∆ (line 10). If we are
guaranteed that Υi is a failing strategy (i.e., Υi is a refinement of one of the
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Algorithm 4 Policy-guided backtracking proof search
Input: G - target proof goal
Input: pi - learned stochastic policy
Input: ∆ - available proof rules
Output: A successful proof strategy for G, or ⊥ if it does not exist
1: procedure RelVerif(G, pi,∆)
2: W ← {Υ0(G)} . worklist of proof strategies
3: B ← ∅ . blocked proof strategies
4: while W 6= ∅ do
5: Υ ← ChooseStrategy(pi,W ) . Use policy
6: W ← W \ {Υ}
7: for Ri ∈ ∆ do
8: if ¬Applies(Ri,Υ) then
9: continue
10: Υi ← ApplyProofRule(Υ,Ri)
11: if ∃Υ′ ∈ B. Υi  Υ′ then
12: continue
13: if IsSuccessful(Υi) then return Υi
14: if IsFailing(Υi) then
15: B ← B ∪ { Minimize(Υi) }
16: else if ¬IsComplete(Υi) then
17: W ← W ∪ { Υi }
18: return ⊥
blocked strategies B), then we move on the next proof rule without adding Υi
to the worklist W (lines 11-12). On the other hand, if Υi is successful (i.e., it
is complete and the corresponding CHCs are satisfiable), then we return Υi as
a solution to the relational verification problem (line 13). Otherwise, if Υi is
failing, we compute an unsatisfiable core of the VCs used in Υi and add the
corresponding minimal failing strategy to the blocked strategies B (lines 14-
15). As mentioned earlier, this blocking set B allows the algorithm to prune
strategies that are guaranteed to be unsuccessful.
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In what follows, we explain in more detail (a) how to use pi to find the
most promising proof strategy, and (b) how to compute minimal failing proof
strategies.
4.5.1 Using policy to guide search
In order to use policy pi to guide search, we need a suitable way to pri-
oritize which states to explore first. Intuitively, we want our search algorithm
to have two desired properties: First, complete proof strategies that have a
higher probability of being successful according to ppi should be explored first.
Second, the search must be exhaustive. That is, given a large enough time
limit, the algorithm should return a successful proof strategy if one exists.
One straightforward way to utilize pi is to use a stochastic search al-
gorithm that repeatedly samples complete proof strategies according to the
distribution given by ppi. However, implementing an efficient random sam-
pling algorithm that guarantees exhaustiveness is a challenging task. Instead,
we use a deterministic search algorithm that simply enumerates complete proof
strategies in decreasing order of their probability according ppi. The intuition
is that strategies that are more probable under ppi are more likely to lead to a
successful proof; thus, they should be investigated first.
To ensure that the algorithm prioritizes complete strategies that corre-
spond to more likely rollouts of pi, we introduce a prioritization function `pi as
follows:
`pi(Υ) =
{
1 if Υ = Υ0(G)
`pi(Υ
′)− log pi(Υ′,R) otherwise,
103
where Υ =ApplyProofRule(Υ′,R).
Note that for a complete proof strategy Υ, we have `pi(Υ) = −log ppi(Υ).
Thus, complete proof strategies that are more likely to be successful according
to ppi are assigned a lower value according to `pi.
Going back to Algorithm 4, the function ChooseStrategy simply uses
the function `pi to figure out which proof strategy to dequeue from W . In
particular, ChooseStrategy dequeues the strategy with the lowest `pi value.
Theorem 7. Let Υ1 and Υ2 be two complete non-failing proof strategies. If
ppi(Υ1) > ppi(Υ2), then Υ1 will be explored (i.e., dequed from W ) before Υ2 by
Algorithm 4.
4.5.2 Finding minimal failing strategies
To prevent the search algorithm from exploring failing strategies that
share the same root cause of failure as previously explored ones, we introduce
the following notion of minimal failing proof strategy :
Definition 21 (Minimal failing proof strategy). Given a failing proof
strategy Υ, we say that Υ′ is a minimally failing proof strategy of Υ if the
following conditions hold:
- Υ  Υ′
- Υ′ is failing
- There does not exist Υ′′ 6= Υ′ such that Υ′  Υ′′.
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Algorithm 5 Failing strategy minimization
Input: Υ = (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG) - a failing proof strategy
Output: The corresponding minimal failing proof strategy
1: procedure Minimize(Υ)
2: U ← MinimalUnsatCore({Aϕ(v) | v ∈ V })
3: V⊥ ← {v | Aϕ(v) ∈ U}
4: Vc ← {v ∈ V | ∃u ∈ V⊥. v  u}
5: Vf ← {v ∈ V | v 6∈ Vc ∧ ∃u ∈ Vc. (u→ v) ∈ E}
6: V ′ ← Vc ∪ Vf
7: E ′ ← {u→ v | u ∈ V ′ ∧ v ∈ V ′ ∧ (u→ v) ∈ E}
8: (A′R, A
′
ϕ, A
′
G) ← (AR ↓ V ′, Aϕ ↓ V ′, AG ↓ V ′)
9: for v ∈ Vf do
10: (A′R, A
′
ϕ) ← (A′R[v ← ⊥], A′ϕ[v ←true])
11: return (V ′, E ′, A′R, A
′
ϕ, A
′
G)
Essentially, a minimally failing proof strategy Υ′ for Υ captures the
root cause of failure in the sense that every proof rule in Υ′ is necessary for
generating an unsatisfisfiable system of CHCs in Υ. Thus, any proof strategy
that refines Υ′ is also guaranteed to fail and can be pruned from the search
space without losing completeness.
Now, going back to Algorithm 4, we use a procedure called Minimize
(line 15) to compute a minimally failing strategy. This procedure is summa-
rized in pseudo-code in Algorithm 5. Given a failing strategy Υ, Minimize
first computes a minimal unsatisfiable core of the VCs for Υ. More concretely,
for a failing strategy Υ = (V,E,AG, AR, Aϕ), we compute a subset of nodes
V⊥ ⊆ V such that
∧
v∈V⊥ Aϕ(v) is unsatisfiable but for every U ⊂ V⊥ we have∧
v∈U Aϕ(v) is satisfiable. Hence, V⊥ has the following key properties:
• If we remove nodes that are not in V⊥ from Υ, we still get a failing strategy.
105
• Removing any node in V⊥ from Υ will make it not failing.
In other words, we can view V⊥ as the root cause of failure for strategy
Υ; thus, all nodes that are descendants of V⊥ can be removed from Υ while
preserving unsatisfiability. The Minimize algorithm essentially removes all
nodes V⊥ from Υ but adds open branches as necessary to ensure that the
resulting proof strategy is a valid one that can be refined. 4
The following theorem states that our search algorithm does not prune
any successful proof strategies:
Theorem 8. If there exists a complete proof strategy Υ for goal G such that∧
v∈V Aϕ(v) can be proven satisfiable by the underlying CHC solver, then Al-
gorithm 4 will produce a proof of correctness of G.
4.6 Implementation
We have implemented the proposed ideas in a prototype called Coeus.
Our tool takes as input two C programs and a relational property and outputs
a successful proof strategy if the property can be verified.
As depicted schematically in Figure 4.5, Coeus consists of three ma-
jor components: First, the Proof System component serves as the basis of
the entire system and implements the relational proof rules for reducing the
4In Algorithm 5, the notation v  u indicates that there is a path from v to u in Υ, and
the notation A ↓ V yields a new mapping A′ that is the same as A except that its domain
is restricted to V .
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Proof
Coeus
Figure 4.5: Coeus architecture
relational verification task to standard safety. The Reinforcement Learning
component implements the learning algorithm described in Section 4.4 and
requires a set of representative training examples. Finally, the Proof Search
component uses the learned policy to guide the search for successful proof
strategies, as described in Section 4.5.
The Reinforcement Learning module is implemented in Python and uses
the PyTorch library [132]. The Proof System and the Proof Search compo-
nents are both implemented in OCaml and use the front-end of the CompCert
compiler [107] for parsing the input C files. As mentioned in Section 4.1,
our implementation uses a CHC solver to both find relational loop invariants
and discharge the resulting safety verification problems. For this purpose, our
implementation leverages an enhanced version of the Spacer CHC solver [98]
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distributed with Z3 [50]. 5
4.7 Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed approach by designing a series of experiments
that address the following questions:
1. How does our proposed approach perform compared to state-of-the-art re-
lational verification tools?
2. What is the impact of using the learned policy during search?
3. What is the impact of backtracking search compared to directly sampling
proof strategies from the learned policy?
4. What kinds of policies does Coeus learn?
5. What is the impact of training on the success of the learned policy?
To answer these questions, we evaluate Coeus on two different bench-
mark suites and compare it against several baselines. For all experiments, we
set a time limit of 300 seconds and a memory limit of 5GB for the proof search
algorithm, and we set a time limit of 15 seconds per CHC solver invocation.
All experiments are conducted on an Arch Linux workstation with an Intel
Xeon E5-2630 CPU (2.6GHz) and 64GB of RAM.
5Similar to the SeaHorn verifier [80], our implementation augments Spacer by incorpo-
rating a Houdini-style algorithm [64].
108
4.7.1 Translation Validation Benchmarks
In our first experiment, we evaluate our approach in the context of
translation validation [134]. Specifically, we use Coeus to check the correct-
ness of various transformations performed by the ROSE compiler infrastruc-
ture [138] from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Specifically, given the
original C program P and its transformed version P ′, we use Coeus to prove
equivalence between P and P ′.
For the purposes of this experiment, we consider five (intra-procedural)
transformation passes from the ROSE library. These transformations include
loop unrolling, loop splitting, loop fission, constant propagation, and partial
redundancy elimination. Given an original C program P , we obtain multiple
transformed programs by applying all possible combinations of these transfor-
mations to P .
Training set. Recall that Coeus has an off-line training phase that is used
for learning an optimal search policy via reinforcement learning. Towards
this goal, we wrote a simple program generator that produces random, self-
contained C functions. For each randomly generated program P , we obtain
multiple transformed programs P1, . . . , Pn as described above and use each
(P, Pi) pair as a training example. Using this methodology, we trained Coeus
on a total of 400 translation validation benchmarks. To give the reader some
idea about the impact of training, Figure 4.6 plots the success rate of the
learned policy against the number of training iterations. As we can see from
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Figure 4.6: Training performance on translation validation training bench-
marks
this figure, the policy gradually adapts itself to better solve the problems in
our training set.
Test set. The programs in our test set come from approximately 80 functions
collected from popular Github repositories written in C. By applying various
combinations of transformations to these functions and eliminating duplicates,
we obtain a total of 153 benchmarks for our test set.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison on translation validation benchmarks
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Results. Figure 4.7 summarizes the results of our evaluation on the trans-
lation validation domain. The x-axis shows the time limit per benchmark,
and the y-axis shows the percentage of benchmarks that can be solved within
that time limit. The different graphs in the figure correspond to the following
several variants of Coeus:
• The blue line (with circles) is the full Coeus system.
• The orange and green lines (with squares and triangles respectively) corre-
spond to variants of Coeus that use the learned policy but not our proposed
search algorithm. Specifically, Single-Rollout only explores a single roll-
out of the learned policy and Multi-Rollout samples multiple rollouts
until a time limit is reached.
• Both the red graph (with crosses) and the purple graph (with pluses) corre-
spond to variants that do not use learning to guide search. The first variant
(labelled Random) uses our search algorithm with a randomly generated
policy, and the latter variant (BFS) uses breadth-first search.
One of the key conclusions to draw from Figure 4.7 is that learning-
guided search significantly boosts the percentage of benchmarks that can be
solved within a given time limit. In particular, both BFS and Random solve
less than 56% of the benchmarks within a 5 minute time-limit whereas Coeus
can solve 91.5% of the benchmarks within the same limit. The second impor-
tant conclusion is that our proposed search algorithm allows us to effectively
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utilize the learned policy. Specifically, the Single-Rollout and Multi-
Rollout variants plateau at 71.9% and 75.2% respectively, whereas Coeus
can continue to solve more benchmarks as we increase the time limit.
Comparison against other tools. In addition to comparingCoeus against
its own variants, we also compare it against two state-of-the-art relational veri-
fication tools, namelyVeriMap [49] and a re-implementation ofDescartes [170].
VeriMap is a relational verification tool that uses a method called predicate
pairing for solving constrained Horn clauses that arise in relational proofs.
In contrast, Descartes is based on the CHL program logic and performs
heuristic-guided backtracking search over the CHL proof rules. Since the orig-
inal version of Descartes is for Java programs, we re-implemented a version
of Descartes for C that uses the same proof rules and search heuristics.
As summarized in Table 4.1, Coeus significantly outperforms both
VeriMap and Descartes. Specifically, VeriMap can solve only 11% of
these benchmarks within the 5-minute time limit . However, upon further
inspection, the low success rate of VeriMap is caused, in part, by the bench-
marks containing features (e.g., bitvectors, multi-dimensional arrays) that are
not supported by this tool. If we exclude 130 out of 153 benchmarks that
are not supported by VeriMap, the success rate increases to 73.9%. That is,
VeriMap solves 17 out of these 23 benchmarks, whereas Coeus solves 95.7%.
The success rate of Descartes on this benchmark set is around 50.3% com-
pared to 88.9% for Coeus.
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Translation Validation
Coeus Descartes VeriMap
Number of benchmarks 153
Number of benchmarks supported by each tool 153 153 23
Number of solved benchmarks 136 77 17
Solved benchmarks / All benchmarks 88.9% 50.3% 11.1%
Solved benchmarks / Supported benchmarks 88.9% 50.3% 73.9%
Number of solved commonly supported benchmarks 22 20 17
Solved commonly suppored benchmarks
/ Commonly supported benchmarks
95.7% 87% 73.9%
Average running time for solved benchmarks (sec) 16.1 12.3 32.29
Table 4.1: Comparison with other relational verification tools on translation
validation benchmarks .
Bugs found in ROSE. During the process of running this experiment,
Coeus uncovered two sources of unsoundness in the ROSE compiler. Specifi-
cally, since the accuracy of Coeus on the training set was initially lower than
expected, we manually inspected the benchmarks that could not be verified
using Coeus. Our inspection revealed two subtle bugs in the loop unrolling
and fission transformation passes implemented in ROSE. Note that the results
shown in Figure 4.7 are obtained after fixing the loop unrolling bug and filter-
ing out benchmarks that trigger the source of unsoundness in the loop fission
pass. 6
4.7.2 Multiple Programs written by Humans
In our second experiment, we consider a slightly more challenging sce-
nario for relational verification in which both programs are written by humans.
Specifically, for this experiment, we collected pairs of manually-written pro-
6We did not fix the latter bug since it did not seem to admit an easy fix.
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Miscellaneous
Coeus Descartes VeriMap
Number of benchmarks 106
Number of benchmarks supported by each tool 106 79 65
Number of solved benchmarks 93 44 35
Solved benchmarks / All benchmarks 87.7% 41.5% 33.0%
Solved benchmarks / Supported benchmarks 87.7% 55.7% 53.8%
Number of commonly supported benchmarks 52
Number of solved commonly supported benchmarks 48 37 23
Solved commonly suppored benchmarks
/ Commonly supported benchmarks
92.3% 71.2% 44.2%
Average running time for solved benchmarks (sec) 26.8 16.8 66.52
Table 4.2: Comparison with other relational verification tools on second set of
benchmarks.
grams by considering different solutions to programming challenge problems
from LeetCode and HackerRank as well as pairs of programs considered in
previous work [49]. Furthermore, these benchmarks involve multiple differ-
ent relational properties, including equivalence, non-equivalence, conditional
disequality (i.e., if inputs satisfy some relationship, then outputs should be
different) etc. In total, we consider 292 relational verification benchmarks and
split them into training and test sets as follows: Programs with size smaller
than a certain threshold are used for training, whereas the larger programs
are used for testing. This approach gives us a training set consisting of 186
benchmarks, and a test set consisting of 106. By splitting the benchmark in
this way, we demonstrate how our learning-based search algorithm can gen-
eralize from the smaller examples seen during training to more complex and
challenging benchmarks in the test set.
As we can see from Figure 4.8, the training phase shows a similar trend
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Figure 4.8: Training performance for second experiment
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Figure 4.9: Comparison on existing benchmarks [49] and equivalence checking
problems obtained from solutions to exercises from LeetCode and HackerRank
as in the first experiment. In particular, the accuracy is initially quite low and
steadily improves until approximately 1000 training iterations, after which it
seems to plateau at around 65%.
Results. Figure 4.9 summarizes the results of our evaluation on this bench-
mark set. As in the previous subsection, the x-axis shows the time limit per
benchmark, and the y-axis shows the percentage of benchmarks that can be
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solved within that time limit. Also as before, the different graphs from Fig-
ure 4.9 correspond to the Multi-Rollout, Single-Rollout, Random,
and BFS variants of Coeus.
The trend we see in Figure 4.9 largely follows the one from Figure 4.7.
Specifically, we observe that Coeus performs significantly better than both
BFS and Random, highlighting the importance of guiding search using the
RL-based policy. We also observe that Coeus can solve significantly more
benchmarks compared to Single-Rollout and Multi-Rollout as we in-
crease the time limit. This second observation again corroborates that our
proposed policy-guided proof search algorithm from Section 4.5 allows us to
use the policy much more effectively.
Comparison against VeriMap. As in Section 4.7.1, we also compare the
performance of Coeus against Descartes and VeriMap on this benchmark
set. As shown in Table 4.2, Coeus solves significantly more benchmarks.
Specifically, VeriMap and Descartes are able to solve 35 and 44 of the 106
benchmarks respectively, whereas Coeus solves 93. However, if we exclude
benchmarks that contain features not supported by both Descartes and
VeriMap, we observe that Coeus solves 92.3% of the benchmarks whereas
VeriMap solves 44.2% and Descartes solves 71.2%. We believe these re-
sults demonstrate that the proposed approach improves the state-of-the-art in
relational verification.
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4.7.3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss a number of additional aspects of our algo-
rithm, including (i) evaluating the advantages of being data-driven, (ii) an-
alyzing the learned properties, and (iii) explaining why using policy-guided
search may outperform the single-rollout policy.
Advantages of being data-driven. An important advantage of our pro-
posed approach is that it is data-driven. In particular, a key challenge for
traditional verification tools is that different problem domains typically re-
quire different sets of search heuristics. Thus, to improve performance, a user
must manually design search heuristics tailored to their specific domain of in-
terest. This process can be challenging since it requires that the user is an
expert both in their application domain and also in the internal workings of
the verification algorithm (e.g., the underlying CHC solver). In contrast, given
training data that is representative of a target domain, Coeus automatically
learns a policy that works well specifically for that domain.
We empirically evaluate the advantages of being data-driven by apply-
ing the policy from Section 4.7.1 to the benchmarks from Section 4.7.2 and vice
versa. In particular, in Figure 4.10a, we show two single-rollout performance
curves of Coeus on the translation validation benchmarks. Here, the blue
dotted line represents the performance of Coeus if it uses a policy trained for
the translation validation task, whereas the orange line (with squares) repre-
sents the performance of Coeus if it uses a policy trained on the hand-written
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(a) Benchmarks used in section 4.7.1
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(b) Benchmarks used in section 4.7.2
Figure 4.10: Running Coeus with policies learned from different tasks
programs from Section 4.7.2. As we can see from the large gap between the
blue and orange lines, Coeus performs significantly better when using a pol-
icy that has been trained on translation validation benchmarks. We also see
this trend in Figure 4.10b: the policy trained on the translation validation
benchmarks performs significantly worse when evaluated on the benchmarks
from Section 4.7.2. Overall, we believe these results demonstrate the useful-
ness of learning data-driven relational proof search strategies that are able to
automatically infer domain-specific insights and leverage them to boost per-
formance.
Analysis of learned policies. In this section, we examine the policies
learned by Coeus to better understand the domain-specific insights that they
have inferred. Recall from Section 4.4 that Coeus represents policies using
neural networks, which are notoriously difficult to interpret [178]. To better
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understand the policies learned by Coeus, we approximated each of the two
neural networks (i.e., representing the policies from Sections 4.7.1 & 4.7.2)
using decision trees, and then manually inspect these trees. 7 Based on this
analysis, we made the following observations:
• The policy learns to prioritize rules that minimize the proof length for
loop-free code.
• For our first benchmark (translation validation) in Section 4.7.1, the
policy learns to ignore proof rules that are not relevant to the kinds of
transformations that ROSE performs.
• For our first benchmark, the policy learns to unroll loops when unrolling
would equalize the number of loop iterations. For our second benchmark,
unrolling is picked less often since it is turns out not to be very useful
for the training examples in Section 4.7.2.
• For our second benchmark in Section 4.7.2, when encountering a loop in
one program and function call in the other, the policy often converts the
loop into a tail-recursive procedure.
Despite these fairly intuitive patterns that we have uncovered from the
decision tree, we also found that the learned policy is actually quite complex.
In particular, it takes a decision tree of depth more than 7 to reasonably
7Note that this analysis does not consider the effects of using the learned policy in the
context of a backtracking search algorithm.
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imitate the intricate behavior of the neural network policy. Furthermore, it
is worth noting that the learned policy may perform actions that are quite
unintuitive and that seem to be correlated with the quirks of the underlying
CHC solver. For instance, we find cases where the underlying CHC solver can
much more easily discharge the resulting VCs if two independent statements
are swapped in certain kinds of situations. Surprisingly, the reinforcement
learning algorithm picks up on such quirks of the underlying safety checker.
Thus, Coeus is able to infer unintuitive heuristics that a human would be
unlikely to devise.
Impact of search. As described previously, Figure 4.9 shows that the policy-
guided proof search algorithm substantially outperforms using the policy alone.
We give an example that demonstrates the benefits of our search algorithm. In
particular, Figure 4.11 shows one of the equivalence checking examples from
Section 4.7.2. A successful proof strategy for this problem is to unroll the while
loop in tree0() and then synchronize it with the for loop in tree1(), since
equalizing the iteration counts of the two loops will drastically reduce the dif-
ficulty of solving the generated verification conditions. However, our learned
policy does not favor this strategy—instead, it first tries to “synchronize” the
loops directly and fails to prove equivalence, since the underlying CHC solver
is not able to discharge the VCs. Nevertheless, our search algorithm progres-
sively explores other proof strategies and discovers the right strategy after 12
failed proof attempts.
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int tree0(int n) {
assume(n >= 0 && n <= 60);
int h = 1; int turn = 0;
while (n > 0) {
if (turn == 0) {
h = h * 2; turn = 1;
} else {
h++; turn = 0;
}
n--;
}
return h;
}
int tree1(int n) {
assume(n >= 0 && n <= 60);
int i, x = 1;
if (n != 0) {
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
x = x * 2; i++;
if (i % 2 == 0 && i <= n)
x = x + 1;
}
}
return x;
}
Figure 4.11: Example benchmark programs which require loop unrolling to
verify
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Chapter 5
Related Works
In what follows, we discuss prior work that is most closely related to
this dissertation.
Algorithmic complexity attacks Algorithmic complexity attacks have
been actively studied during the past ten years. Some of these techniques
target a specific class of vulnerabilities. For example, Crosby et al. [47] first
presents a new class of algorithmic complexity attack that exploits the vul-
neralbility in hash tables. Wustholz et al. [185] designs a novel static analy-
sis for automatically finding ReDoS vulnerabilities in Java programs. Cai et
al. [34] intrduces a new algorithmic complexity attack that exploits data races
in Unix file system. Smith et al. [167] explores NIDS (Network Intrusion De-
tection Systems) evasion through algorithmic complexity attacks by leveraging
the pitfall in backtracking algorithms. Shenoy et al. [159] presents a perfor-
mance throttling attack caused by an issue in the original string matching
algorithm. Among approaches that target a broader class of AC vulnerabili-
ties, SlowFuzz [133] is most closely related to the Singularity approach.
In particular, SlowFuzz also uses evolutionary search for generating inputs
but performs mutations at the byte level. In contrast, our method looks for
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input patterns rather than concrete inputs and can therefore scale better when
large input sizes are required.
Performance bug detection. As demonstrated through our experiments
in chapter 2.5, Singularity can be useful for uncovering performance bugs.
In this sense, our technique is related to a long line of work on performance
bug detection. Most of these techniques target narrow classes of performance
problems, such as redundant traversals [125, 126, 51, 129], loop inefficien-
cies [124, 52, 169], and unnecessary object creation [56]. Compared to these
techniques, Singularity can to detect a broader class of performance bugs
but requires the user to decide whether the reported worst-case complexity
corresponds to a performance bug.
Testing for performance There is a long line of work on automated testing
techniques to uncover performance problems [33, 177, 195, 75, 136, 44, 191].
Among these prior techniques, Wise [33] is the first one to introduce the
complexity testing problem, where the goal is to determine the complexity of a
given program by constructing test cases that exhibit worst-case behavior. At
a high level, Wise uses an optimized version of dynamic symbolic execution
to guide the search towards execution paths with high resource usage. While
Wise is a white-box testing technique, our approach is purely black-box and
can scale to larger input sizes.
From a technical perspective, PerfSyn [177] is more similar to our ap-
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proach in that it uses black-box evolutionary search to generate tests that
cause performance bottlenecks. Specifically, PerfSyn starts with a minimal
usage example of the method under test and applies a sequence of mutations
that modify the original code. However, a key difference is that PerfSyn fo-
cuses on performance bottlenecks related to API usage, whereas our approach
focuses on finding input patterns that trigger worst-case complexity.
Another idea related to performance testing is empirical computational
complexity [75]. In particular, Goldsmith et al. propose a technique for mea-
suring empirical complexity by running the program on workloads spanning
several orders of magnitude in size and fitting these observations to a model
that predicts performance as a function of input size. Since this technique
requires the user to manually provide representative workloads, our approach
is complementary to theirs.
Side channel attacks Side-channel attacks related to resource usage have
been known for decades. Specifically, side channels have been used to leak
private cryptographic keys [97, 3, 32], infer user accounts [30], steal cellphone
and credit card numbers [70], obtain web browsing history [60], and recover the
plaintext of encrypted TLS traffic [5]. Chen et al. presents a comprehensive
study of side-channel leaks in web applications [38].
Verification for non-interference As mentioned in Section 3.4, we can
prove that a program is free of side channel leaks by proving that it obeys a
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certain kind of non-interference property. There has been a significant body
of work on proving non-interference. The simplest and most well-known tech-
nique for proving non-interference (and, in general, any 2-safety property)
is self-composition [17]. The general idea underlying self-composition is as
follows: Given a program P and 2-safety property φ, we create a new pro-
gram P ′ which sequentially composes two α-renamed copies of P and then
asserts that φ holds. Effectively, self-composition reduces verification of 2-
safety to standard safety. While this self-composition technique is sound and
relatively complete, successfully verifying the new program often requires the
safety checker to come up with intricate invariants that are difficult to infer
automatically [176]. Dufay et al. try to solve this problem by providing those
invariants through JML annotations [55]; however, the resulting approach re-
quires significant manual effort on the part of the developer or security analyst.
Another popular approach for proving k-safety is to construct so-called
product programs [14, 15, 190]. Similar to self-composition, the product pro-
gram method also reduces k-safety to standard safety by constructing a new
program containing an assertion. While there are several different methods for
constructing the product program, the central idea –shared in this work– is
to execute the different copies of the program in lock step whenever possible.
One disadvantage of this approach is that it can cause a blow-up in program
size. As shown in the work of Sousa and Dillig [170], the product program
approach can therefore suffer from scalability problems.
The approach advocated in this thesis is most closely related to rela-
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tional program logic, such as Cartesian Hoare Logic [170] and Relational Hoare
Logic [23]. Specifically, the QCHL program logic introduced in Section 3.4.1
builds on top of CHL by instantiating it in the -bounded non-interference
setting and augmenting it with additional rules for tracking resource usage
and utilizing taint information. One advantage of this approach over explicit
product construction is that we decompose the proof into smaller lemmas by
constructing small product programs on-the-fly rather than constructing a
monolithic program that is subsequently checked by an off-the-shelf verifier.
The approach described in Chapter 3 also shares similarities with the
work of Terauchi and Aiken, in which they extend self-composition with type-
directed translation [176, 122]. In particular, this technique uses a type system
for secure information flow to guide product construction. Specifically, similar
to our use of taint information to determine when two loops can be synchro-
nized, Terauchi and Aiken use type information to construct a better product
program than standard self-composition. Our verification technique differs
from this approach in two major ways: First, our algorithm is not guided
purely by taint information and uses other forms of semantic information (e.g.,
relational loop invariants) to determine when two loops can be executed in lock
step. Second, similar to other approaches for product construction, the type-
directed translation method generates a new program that is subsequently
verified by an off-the-shelf verifier. In contrast, our method decomposes the
proof into smaller lemmas by constructing mini-products on-the-fly, as needed.
Almeida et al. implement a tool named ct-verif based on aforemen-
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tioned techniques (involving both product programs and self-composition) [6].
In particular, ct-verif is designed for verifying the constant-time policy, which
roughly corresponds to our notion of 0-bounded non-interference instantiated
with a timing cost model. In addition to using different techniques based
on QCHL and taint analysis, Themis provides support for verifying a more
general property, namely -bounded non-interference for any value of .
An alternative approach for verifying k-safety is the decomposition
method used in Blazer [8]: This method decomposes execution traces into
different partitions using taint information and then verifies k-safety of the
whole program by proving a standard safety property of each partition. One
possible disadvantage of this approach is that, unlike our method and product
construction techniques, Blazer does not directly reason about the relation-
ship between a pair of program executions. As illustrated through some of the
examples in Section 3.4.1, such relational reasoning can greatly simplify the
verification task in many cases.
In their recent work, Ngo et al. propose a language-based system for
verifying and synthesizing synthesizes programs with constant-resource usage,
meaning that every execution path of the program consumes the same amount
of resource [123]. This technique uses a novel type system to reason both lo-
cally and globally about the resource usage bounds of a given program. Similar
to work for verifying constant-time policy, this technique also does not allow
proving -bounded non-interference for arbitrary values of . Furthermore,
as a type-based solution for a functional language, this technique puts heav-
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ier annotation burden on the developer and is not immediately applicable to
standard imperative languages like Java or C.
Secure information flow There has been a significant body of work on
language-based solutions for enforcing information flow properties [193, 135,
121, 187]. For instance, Zhang et al. [193] propose a language-based approach
that tracks side-channel leakage, and
Pottier et al. [135] design a type-based information flow analysis inside
an ML-style language. Themis differs from these language-based solutions in
that it requires minimal annotation effort and works on existing Java programs.
One of the most popular tools for tracking information flow in existing
Java applications is FlowDroid [9], and Themis builds on top of FlowDroid
to identify secret-tainted variables. FlowTracker [146] is another information
flow analysis for C/C++ featuring efficient representation of implicit flow. We
believe these techniques are complimentary to our approach, and a tool like
Themis can directly benefit from advances in such static taint tracking tools.
There have also been attempts at verifying the constant-time policy
directly using information-flow checking [12]. However, this approach is flow-
insensitive (and therefore imprecise) and imposes a number of restrictions on
the input program.
Automatic resource bound computation There has been a flurry of re-
search on statically computing upper bounds for the resource usage of im-
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perative programs. Existing techniques for this purpose leverage abstract
interpretation [79], size-change abstraction [196], lossy vector addition sys-
tems [165], linear programming [35], difference constraints [166], recurrence
relations [7, 66, 4], and term rewriting [31]. Another line of research, called
AARA [88, 86, 84, 87, 85], performs bound analysis on functional languages.
Themis differs from these approaches in that we perform relational rea-
soning about resource usage. That is, rather than computing an upper bound
on the resource usage of the program, we use QCHL to prove an upper bound
on the difference between the resource usage of two program runs. Similar to
our QCHL, recent work by C¸ic¸ek et al. performs relational cost analysis to
reason about the difference in resource usage of a pair of programs [36]. Their
work shares with us the insight that relational analysis may be simplified by
exploiting the structural similarity between the inputs as well as the program
codes. However, their non-relational reasoning relies on range analysis while
Themis relies on Hoare-style weakest precondition computation; as a result
Themis is more precise. Also, Themis analyzes real-world Java programs,
while [36] is built on top of a hypothetical higher-order functional language.
Other defenses against side channels In this thesis, we consider a purely
static approach for detecting resource side channels. However, there are other
possible ways of detecting vulnerabilities and preventing against side channel
attacks. For instance, Bang et al. use symbolic execution and model counting
to quantify leakage for a particular type of side channel [11]. Pasareanu et
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al. have recently implemented a symbolic execution based algorithm for gen-
erating inputs that maximize side channel measurements (namely timing and
memory usage) [130]. Sidebuster [194] uses a hybrid static/dynamic analysis
to detect side-channels based on irregularities in the One key advantage of our
approach compared to these other techniques is that it can be used to verify
the absence of side-channel vulnerabilities in programs.
There has also been a line of research that focuses for defending against
side channels using runtime systems [113], compilers [118, 140, 141], or secure
hardware [110]. Unlike these techniques, our approach does not result in run-
time overhead.
Relational verification As stated in Section 4, relational verification prob-
lems are typically solved by reducing them to standard safety. Generally
speaking, there are three different strategies for performing this reduction:
Specifically, some approaches explicitly construct a product program that is
safe iff the original relational verification problem is valid [17, 13, 16, 58].
Other approaches [23, 18, 37, 170] propose program logics for decomposing
the relational verification task into a set of Hoare triples. Finally, some tech-
niques [59, 49, 120] directly encode the relational verification problem as a
set of constrained Horn clauses and propose new CHC solving techniques to
deal with the resulting constraints [49, 120]. While these approaches define
the space of strategies for reducing relational verification to safety checking,
they do not propose algorithms for efficiently and intelligently exploring the
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large search space of different reduction strategies. In contast, the main con-
tribution of Chapter 4 is to show how reinforcement learning can be used for
effectively guiding the search for relational proofs.
Machine learning for program analysis. There have been several recent
successes in applying machine learning to programming languages research,
for example, to infer program invariants [157, 155, 128], to improve program
analysis [108, 112, 144, 139] and synthesis [149, 150, 10, 143, 62, 61, 93, 106],
to build probabilistic models of code [145, 26, 142], to infer specifications [99,
111, 22, 83, 27, 20, 21], and software testing [109, 41, 72]. There is also a line
of work on applying machine learning to theorem proving by predicting which
lemmas are useful to prove a given theorem and then feeding those lemmas to
a traditional theorem prover [89, 183]. However, these approaches treat the
selection of promising lemmas as a one-shot problem rather than a sequential
decision making problem.
Another related work uses machine learning (stochastic search) to per-
form equivalence checking [158]. Unlike our approach, their technique does
not transfer knowledge across programs and is tailored to checking equiva-
lence between two loops. Furthermore, recent work has applied reinforcement
learning to improve polyhedral analysis [164]. Their technique learns a policy
for choosing parameters for approximating the join transformer. However, the
reinforcement learning problem in our setting is significantly more challenging
since we do not observe rewards until the very end of a rollout.
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There has also been recent work using reinforcement learning to infer
loop invariants [162]. Their approach uses the policy gradient algorithm itself
to search for candidate loop invariants, but they do not learn across problem
instances. In contrast, we first learn a good policy on the training set, but
then use our policy-guided search algorithm to search for successful relational
proofs on different problem instances. Finally, there has been some recent
work applying reinforcement learning to program synthesis [163]. Unlike our
work, their algorithm does not need to account for the search distribution—in
particular, they use the policy gradient algorithm to perform program synthesis
for each new problem instance. In contrast, our algorithm uses a policy-
guided search algorithm to find successful proof strategies. As we show in our
evaluation, our policy-guided search substantially improves the performance
of our algorithm.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we discuss three programming analysis techniques: one
dynamic fuzzing technique for identifying worst-case complexity and two static
verification techniques for enforcing relational properties. A common theme
among all these solutions is to exploit problem-specific structures and adapt
existing techniques to exploit those structures accordingly.
In the case of Singularity, the critical observation we rely on is that
worst-case inputs for a give program are often characterized by certain pat-
terns, and for algorithmic complexity analysis pattern searching is more ef-
fective and scalable than directly searching for concrete inputs. Therefore,
we adapt existing evolutionary technique for dynamic fuzzing by equipping it
with a novel program representation, and shift the focus from fuzzing inputs
to optimal program synthesis in this representation accordingly.
In the case of Themis, two key observations are: (1) Reasoning about
cost difference is usually easier to automate than reasoning about cost values
themselves directly. (2) Code that handles secret is typically small in large
software projects. We therefore adapt existing off-the-shelf verifier with QCHL
to fully utilize observation 1, and connect the verifier to a taint tracker based
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on observation 2.
In the case of Coeus, we observe that the sequences of proof rules that
are most amenable to automation often follow certain patterns but sometimes
deviate from them. Although these patterns can sometimes be hard to specify
by a human, they can be empirically learned from data. The learned model
can also provide us with valuable information to guide an exhaustive search,
which effectively takes care of the aforementioned deviations if the model fails
to predict the best strategy.
Looking to the future, this thesis opens up the following further research
directions:
Applicability of Singularity. In chapter 2.5 we evaluate Singularity
using a simple DSL with a small pool of components. Although our current
selection of components is already good enough for a wise range of applica-
tions, certain problems (such as forcing hash collision on more sophisticated
hash functions like MurmurHash and SipHash) seem to require more powerful
components. Given a new problem domain, adapting the Singularity tech-
nique by designing new components that are likely to maximize the fuzzing
efficiency will be an interesting challenge from a system’s perspective.
Extending Themis with Coeus. Although we motivate the technique in
Coeus with noninterference verification, we did not evaluate the technique
in Themis’ context. It would be interesting to prepare a sizable collection of
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noninterference verification benchmarks for Themis, and measure how Coeus
could help in terms of false positive rates.
Coeus on other domains. The basic principle behind Coeus is not re-
stricted to relational verification only: Any search problem that can be mod-
eled as a proof system with an oracle, a fixed set of rules and a collection of
training data can be a potential target where Coeus’ principle may be used
to improve the level of proof automation. Finding new domains and designing
automation-friendly proof systems for it may help contributing to the adoption
of formal methods in the real world.
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Appendix 1
Proofs of Selected Theorems
1.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 2. Let program P = λ~p.S. If the following premises hold:
• ~p1 = α(~p), ~p2 = α(~p)
• |= I → ~p1l = ~p2l ∧ ~p1h 6= ~p2h
• Σ is sound
• Σ ` CanSynchronize(e1, e2, S1, S2, I)
Then |= I → (e1 ↔ e2).
Proof. According to figure 3.6, if Σ ` CanSynchronize(e1, e2, S1, S2, I), then
at least one of the two conditions must be true:
• |= I → (e1 ↔ e2)
• e1 ≡α e2 ∧ S1 ≡α S2 ∧ Σ ` e1 : low ∧ Σ ` e2 : low
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If the first condition is true, then the conclusion trivially holds. Otherwise,
since Σ is sound, we know that e1 and e2 depend solely on ~p1
l and ~p2
l, re-
spectively. According to the first two premises, I → ~p1l = ~p2l. It follows that
I → e1 = e2 and therefore |= I → (e1 ↔ e2).
Lemma 3. Let vars(S) be the set of all free variables in S. If vars(S1) ∩
vars(S2) = ∅, then S1;S2 is semantically equivalent to S2;S1.
Proof. Suppose Γ ` S1;S2 : Γ′, r. Since vars(S1) and vars(S2) are mutually
disjoint, we could break Γ into three partitions Γ = Γ1 unionsq Γ2 unionsq Γ3, where
dom(Γ1) = vars(S1), dom(Γ2) = vars(S2) and dom(Γ3) = dom(Γ)\vars(S1)\
vars(S2). Since Si does not touch Γj where i 6= j, we have
Γ1 ` S1 : Γ′1, r1 Γ2 ` S2 : Γ′2, r2
It follows that
Γ ` S1 : Γ′1 unionsq Γ2 unionsq Γ3, r1 Γ ` S2 : Γ1 unionsq Γ′2 unionsq Γ3, r2
Γ′1 unionsq Γ2 unionsq Γ3 ` S2 : Γ′1 unionsq Γ′2 unionsq Γ3, r1 + r2
Γ1 unionsq Γ′2 unionsq Γ3 ` S1 : Γ′1 unionsq Γ′2 unionsq Γ3, r2 + r1
Using the operational semantics rule for sequential composition shown in fig-
ure 3.4, this means
Γ ` S1;S2 : Γ′1 unionsq Γ′2 unionsq Γ3, r1 + r2
Γ ` S2;S1 : Γ′1 unionsq Γ′2 unionsq Γ3, r2 + r1
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As S1;S2 and S2;S1 both have the same effect on Γ and consume the same
amount of resource, they are semantically equivalent.
Lemma 4. Let program P = λ~p.S. Under the assumption that the following
premises hold:
• ~p1 = α(~p), ~p2 = α(~p)
• |= Φ→ ~p1l = ~p2l ∧ ~p1h 6= ~p2h
• Σ is sound
If Σ ` 〈Φ〉 S1 ~ S2〈Ψ〉, then ` {Φ} S1;S2 {Ψ}.
Proof. By structural induction on proof rules shown in figure 3.5.
• Rule (1).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {Φ}S2;S1{Ψ}. Since S1 and S2 belongs to
two different alpha-renamed copies of the program, we have vars(S1) ∩
vars(S2) = ∅. Using lemma 3, we get ` {Φ}S1;S2{Ψ}
• Rule (2).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {Φ}S1; skip;S2{Ψ}. As S1; skip is semanti-
cally equivalent to S1, we have ` {Φ}S1;S2{Ψ}.
• Rule (3).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {Φ′}S2;S3{Ψ}. Also, we know {Φ}S1{Φ′}.
Using the sequence rule in standard Hoare logic, we derive ` {Φ}S1;S2;S3{Ψ}.
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• Rule (4).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {Φ}S{Ψ}. As S is semantically equivalent
to S; skip, we get {Φ}S; skip{Ψ}.
• Rule (5).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {Φ∧e}S1;S;S3{Ψ1} and ` {Φ∧¬e}S2;S;S3{Ψ2}.
Since |= Ψ1 → Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 and |= Ψ2 → Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2, according to the conse-
quence rule in standard Hoare logic we have {Φ ∧ e}S1;S;S3{Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2}
and {Φ ∧ ¬e}S2;S;S3{Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2}. With the sequence rule in standard
Hoare logic, assume
1. ` {Φ ∧ e}S1{Φ1}
2. ` {Φ1}S;S3{Ψ1 ∨Ψ2}
3. ` {Φ ∧ ¬e}S2{Φ2}
4. ` {Φ2}S;S3{Ψ1 ∨Ψ2}.
Let Φ′ = wp(Ψ1∨Ψ2). It follows immediately from (2) and (4) that Φ1 →
Φ′ and Φ2 → Φ′. We could apply the consequence rule again to (1) and
(3) and derive ` {Φ∧ e}S1{Φ′} and ` {Φ∧¬e}S2{Φ′}. Using the condi-
tion rule in standard Hoare logic, we have {Φ}if e then S1 else S2{Φ′}.
Combining (2), (4), sequence rule and the definition of wp, we could fi-
nally derive ` {Φ}if e then S1 else S2;S;S3{Ψ1 ∨Ψ2}.
• Rule (6).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {Ψ′}S;S ′{Ψ}. We also know that ` {Φ}while e1 do S1{Φ′}
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and ` {Φ′}while e2 do S2{Ψ′}. Applying the sequence rule in standard
Hoare logic twice, we get ` {Φ}while e1 do S1; while e2 do S2;S;S ′{Ψ}.
Additionally, S and while e2 do S2 comes from two different alpha-
renamed copies so vars(S)∩vars(while e2 do S2) = ∅. We could apply
lemma 3 and get
` {Φ}while e1 do S1;S; while e2 do S2;S ′{Ψ}
• Rule (7).
By inductive hypothesis, ` {I ∧ e1 ∧ e2}S1;S2{I ′} and ` {I ∧ ¬e1 ∧
e2}S;S ′{Ψ}. As |= I ′ → I, we have ` {I ∧ e1 ∧ e2}S1;S2{I} due to
consequence rule. Now we may apply the while rule in standard Hoare
logic to obtain ` {I}while e1 ∧ e2 do (S1;S2){I ∧ ¬(e1 ∧ e2)}.
Now, as following two statements are semantically equivalent:
- while e1 ∧ e2 do (S1;S2)
- while e1 ∧ e2 do (S1;S2); while e1 do S1; while e2 do S2
we could replace the former with the latter:
` {I}while e1 ∧ e2 do (S1;S2); while e1 do S1;
while e2 do S2{I ∧ ¬(e1 ∧ e2)}
According to lemma 2, |= I → (e1 ↔ e2). But we also know that the pre-
condition I∧¬(e1∧e2) holds before the second loop while e1 do S1. This
implies I¬e1 ∧ ¬e2 and therefore both of the two loops while e1 do S1
and while e2 do S2 would not execute, which means ` {I ∧ ¬(e1 ∧
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e2)}while e1 do S1; while e2 do S2{I ∧¬(e1 ∧ e2)}. Applying the con-
sequence rule here we end up with
` {I}while e1 do S1; while e2 do S2{I ∧ ¬(e1 ∧ e2)}. Combining this
with |= Φ→ I and the second inductive hypothesis we finally get
` {Φ}while e1 do S1;S; while e2 do S2;S ′{Ψ}.
Theorem 9 (Soundness). Assuming soundness of taint environment Σ, if
Σ ` SideChannelFree(λ~p.S, ), then the program λ~p.S does not have an
-bounded resource side-channel.
Proof. We know that Σ is sound and |= Φ→ ~p1l = ~p2l ∧ ~p1h 6= ~p2h. Therefore,
lemma 4 applies, and we get ` {Φ}Sτ1 ;Sτ2{Ψ}. Additionally, |= Ψ → |τ1 −
τ2| ≤ |. Using the consequence rule in standard Hoare logic, we obtain `
{Φ}Sτ1 ;Sτ2{|τ1 − τ2| ≤ |}. By the soundness of Hoare logic, it follows that
|= {Φ}Sτ1 ;Sτ2{|τ1− τ2| ≤ |}. By the soundness of self-composition, this means
that
∀~a1, ~a2. ~a1l = ~a2l ∧ ~a1h 6= ~a2h =⇒ |τ1 − τ2| ≤ 
By lemma 1, τ1 = RP (~a1) and τ2 = RP (~a2). Substitute τ with RP we arrive
at our conclusion
∀~a1, ~a2. (~a1l = ~a2l ∧ ~a1h 6= ~a2h) =⇒ |RP (~a1)−RP (~a2)| ≤ 
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1.2 Proof of Theorem 4
First, we show that the mapping from policies pi to distributions p(pi) is
invertible:
Lemma 5. Given a distribution p over complete proof strategies, we have
p(pi) = p, where
pi(S,A) =
∑
S′∗P (S,A) p˜(S
′)∑
S′∗S p˜(S
′)
.
Proof. First, because transitions are deterministic, we have
p(pi)(S) ∝
∑
ζ
I[ST = S] · p(S0 | S0) ·
T−1∏
i=0
pi(Si, Ai),
where p(S0 | S0) is the probability that the initial state is S0. Furthermore,
note that there is a unique way of constructing any given complete proof strat-
egy S ∈ SF using actions A ∈ A. Letting ζS = ((S0, A0, R0), ..., (ST ,∅, RT ))
denote the unique rollout with terminal state ST = S, we have
p(pi)(S) = p(S0 | S0) ·
T−1∏
i=0
pi(Si, Ai).
Expanding the right-hand side, we have
p(pi)(S) = p(S0 | S0) ·
T−1∏
i=0
∑
S′∗P (Si,Ai) p(S
′)∑
S′∗Si p(S
′)
= p(S0 | S0) ·
T−1∏
i=0
∑
S′∗Si+1 p(S
′)∑
S′∗Si p(S
′)
= p(S0 | S0) ·
∑
S′∗ST p(S
′)∑
S′∗S0 p(S
′)
.
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Note that the numerator of the last line equals p(ST ), since the only S
′ such
that S ′ ∗ ST for a complete state ST is ST itself. Similarly, the denominator
equals p(S0 | S0), since the sets of states {S ′ | S ′ ∗ S0} are disjoint for
different initial states S0. In other words, p
(pi)(S) = p(S), as claimed.
As a consequence, the space over policies (which reinforcement learning algo-
rithms optimize over) and the space of distributions (which (4.1) optimizes
over) are equal. Next, we prove that given a policy pi, its cumulative reward
of pi equals the objective (4.1) evaluated at p˜ = p(pi):
Lemma 6. For any policy pi for Mproof, we have
R(pi) = Pr
t∼T,S∼p(pi)t
[O(S)],
where p
(pi)
t is the distribution p
(pi) conditioned on task t:
p
(pi)
t = p
(pi) | S is labeled with the initial proof goal for t.
Proof. Note that since complete proofs are terminal states, and we only obtain
reward on successful proofs (which are complete by definition). Thus, we have
R(pi) = Eζ∼pi
[
T∑
i=0
Ri
]
= Eζ∼pi[RT ]
= Eζ∼pi[O(ST )].
Finally, by definition, the distribution of ST given a randomly sampled rollout
ζ ∼ pi equals the distribution p(pi), so
R(pi) = PrS∼p(pi) [O(S)],
as claimed.
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The proof of Theorem 4 follows from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
1.3 Proof of Theorem 6
We can rewrite the objective J(θ) of (4.3) as follows:
Lemma 7. We have
J(θ) =
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
R(piθ,i).
Proof. Note that
ξ
(t)
r,θ(S) =
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
pi,
where pi = ppiθ,i . Thus, we have
J(θ) = Pr
t∼T,S∼ξ(t)r,θ
[O(S) = 1]
= E
t∼T,S∼ξ(t)r,θ
[O(S)]
= Et∼T
[
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
E
S∼p(t)piθ,i
[O(S)]
]
=
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
E
t∼T,S∼p(t)piθ,i
[O(S)]
=
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
ES∼ppiθ,i [O(S)]
=
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
Eζ∼piθ,i [O(ST )]
=
1
r + 1
r∑
i=0
R(piθ,i),
as claimed.
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Now, let τ denote the function by which our search algorithm constructs
piθ,i+1 from piθ,i, i.e.,
piθ,i =
{
piθ if i = 0
τ(piθ,i−1, θ) otherwise.
Then, consider the derivative of τ with respect to θ:
dτ
dθ
(pi, θ) =
∂τ
∂pi
(pi, θ)
dpi
dθ
+
∂τ
∂θ
(pi, θ),
where the gradient with respect to pi is the gradient with respect to the proba-
bilities pi(S,A) of taking action A in state S. We have the following important
fact about τ :
Lemma 8. We have
∂τ
∂pi
(pi, θ) = 0,
except on a measure zero subset.
Proof. (sketch) Our search algorithm constructs piθ,i from piθ,i−1 by first con-
structing the most probable rollout ζmax according to piθ,i−1, and constructing
piθ,i deterministically from ζmax and θ, i.e.,
piθ,i = τ˜(ζmax, θ).
In other words, τ(pi, θ) = τ˜(ζmax, θ), where ζmax is the most probable rollout
according to pi. However, note that ζmax is from a discrete set. Therefore, for
fixed θ, τ must be a piecewise constant function of pi, so the claim follows.
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Intuitively, this lemma says that the way in which we construct the sequence
of policies piθ,0, piθ,1, ... is not affected by small changes to θ. An important
consequence is that
dτ
dθ
(pi, θ) =
∂τ
∂θ
(pi, θ).
Finally, Theorem 6 follows directly from Lemma 7, Theorem 5, and Lemma 8.
1.4 Proof of Theorem 7
First, we need to introduce the notion of the length of a proof strategy.
Definition 22. The length of a proof strategy Υ, written as L(Υ), is defined
as follows:
- For any proof goal G, L (Υ0(G)) = 0.
- If Υ 1 Υ′, then L(Υ) = 1 + L(Υ′).
Intuitively, proof length keeps track of how many proof rules have been
applied. In this thesis, we only consider proof strategies of finite
length.
Lemma 9. Given two proof strategies Υ1 and Υ2, if Υ1  Υ2, then `pi(Υ1) ≥
`pi(Υ2).
Proof. The lemma can be proved by induction on the difference of length
between Υ1 and Υ2.
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Lemma 10. If a proof strategy Υ is non-failing, then for all strategy Υ′ such
that Υ  Υ′, Υ′ is non-failing.
Proof. This lemma follows directly from the definition 13: for Υ = (V,E,AR, Aϕ, AG)
and Υ′ = (V ′, E ′, A′R, A
′
ϕ, A
′
G), if Υ  Υ′, then
∧
v∈V ′ A
′
ϕ(v) contains strictly
less clauses than
∧
v∈V Aϕ(v). If the latter is satisfiable, the former must also
be satisfiable as it is strictly weaker.
We now prove Theorem 7 by contradiction. Let Υ1 and Υ2 be two
complete non-failing proof strategies and ppi(Υ1) > ppi(Υ2) (thus `pi(Υ1) <
`pi(Υ2)). Suppose Υ2 gets dequeued from W before Υ1 on line 5 in Algorithm 4.
Since ChooseStrategy always picks the strategy with the smallest value of `pi,
we know that Υ1 must not be in W when Υ2 gets dequeued.
We now consider the “predecessors” of Υ1 in the search algorithm,
i.e. P = {Υ∗|Υ1  Υ∗}. We know that Υ1 is non-failing, so according to
Lemma 10 strategies in P will also be non-failing and thus will not be blocked
by B on line 11 to 12. Since all proof strategies explored in Algorithm 4
refines the initial strategy Υ0(G) for the initial goal G, and the initial strategy
is enqueued into W on line 2, there must exist one Υ∗ ∈ P such that Υ∗ is in
W when Υ2 is dequeued.
According to lemma 9, we have `pi(Υ
∗) ≤ `pi(Υ1). Hence `pi(Υ∗) <
`pi(Υ2), which means that when Υ
∗ and Υ2 are both in W , Υ∗ will be dequeued
first. This contradicts our earlier assumption that Υ2 is dequeued before Υ
∗.
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1.5 Proof Theorem 8
We only need to prove the proposition that when the function RelVerif(G, pi,∆)
returns ⊥, every non-failing strategy must have been checked for successful-
ness on by Algorithm 4 on line 13. Theorem 8 is a direct corollary of this
proposition.
The proof can be carried out by induction on the length of the non-
failing strategies.
- When L(Υ) = 0, Υ = Υ0(G). The conclusion hold trivially as the initial
strategy is guaranteed to reach line 13 in the first iteration of the for loop.
- Assume the proposition holds for non-failing strategies with length n − 1
where n ≥ 1.
Let Υ = ApplyProofRule(Υ′,R) with L(Υ) = n. By inductive hypothesis
we know that line 13 must have been reached with Υi = Υ
′ before. As Υ′ is
both not failing and not complete by definition, line 17 will be reached and
Υ′ will be enqueued in W .
Now consider the iteration when Υ′ gets dequeued at line 5. Line 10 is
guaranteed be reached with Υi = Υ. Since Υ is also non-failing, it will
not be blocked by B on line 11 to 12. Therefore, Υ will be checked for
successfulnesss on line 13 as well.
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